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I. INTRODUCTION: 2020—AN UGLY YEAR FOR OIL & GAS
To put it simply, 2020 was an exceptionally trying year for the
United States' oil and gas industry and, as a result, for energy lenders. As
2020 began, West Texas Intermediate (“WTI”) crude oil futures traded at
approximately $61 per barrel.1 On January 21, 2020, the United States
Energy Information Association projected moderately declining prices
through the first half of 2020, predicated in part on unrest in the Middle
East and other geopolitical factors. 2 Unfortunately, WTI prices declined
at a considerably steeper rate than expected. By February 1, 2020, WTI
traded at approximately $50 per barrel.3 Things would only get worse.
By then, the COVID-19 pandemic was wreaking havoc on the
economies of China and several other nations, causing a dramatic decline
in international demand for crude oil.4 In its February Oil Market Report,
the International Energy Association predicted a massive contraction in
global demand for oil resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.5 At or
around that same time, members of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) and other non-member oil exporting
1. Crude Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate (WTI) – Cushing, Oklahoma 1Y, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=NPX [https://perma.cc/ZBX8X9Q2] [hereinafter Crude Oil Prices] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
2. Matt French, EIA Forecasts Crude Oil Prices Will Fall in the First Half of 2020, Then
Rise
Through
2021,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Jan.
21,
2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42535 [https://perma.cc/W3EB-TCCN].
3. Crude Oil Prices, supra note 1.
4. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, OIL MARKET REPORT - FEBRUARY 2020 1 (2020),
https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-february-2020
[https://perma.cc/GAM2QGAP].
5. Id. (projecting “the first quarterly contraction in more than 10 years.”).
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nations, led in large part by Russia,6 engaged in discussions of additional
production cuts to manage long-term pricing.7 On Friday, March 6, 2020,
those discussions collapsed when Russia refused to join in OPEC's
proposed production cuts, sparking a dangerous production and pricing
war between Saudi Arabia and Russia.8 Saudi Arabia returned fire by
offering dramatic discounts on the price of its oil and announcing plans
to ramp up its production. The effects of that price war manifested
immediately. On Monday, March 9, 2020, oil prices saw their greatest
single-day decline since 1991.9
As COVID-19 spread, many nations, including the United States,
implemented shutdowns or other “containment measures”10 in an effort
to mitigate the spread of the pandemic.11 The combined effects of
reduced global demand, the Saudi-Russia price war, and excess supply
were devastating. On March 5, 2020, WTI traded at $45.90.12 By March

6. OPEC's member-nations and 10 non-member nations led by Russia are collectively
known as “OPEC+”. See David Hodari et al., Oil Prices Plunge After Russia-Saudi Split,
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 6, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-russiandeadlock-pushes-brent-crude-to-2-year-low-11583500044?page=53
[https://perma.cc/WR2P-RH3M].
7. Stanley Reed, Oil Prices Nose-Dive as OPEC and Russia Fail to Reach a Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/business/opec-oil-pricesrussia.html [https://perma.cc/8ZAM-Y8AN]; see also Will Kennedy, Why the OPEC-Russia
Blowup Sparked All-Out Oil Price War, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2020, 12:28 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-09/why-opec-russia-blowup-sparkedall-out-oil-price-war-quicktake [https://perma.cc/W22X-L3AX].
8. Ariel Cohen, OPEC+ Talks Collapse Sending Crude Prices to 2017 Lows, FORBES (Mar.
6, 2020, 5:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2020/03/06/opec-talks-collapsesending-crude-prices-to-2017-lows/?sh=a644d38431d6 [https://perma.cc/AZW8-VGJK].
9. Natasha Turak, Oil Nose-Dives as Saudi Arabia and Russia Set Off ‘Scorched Earth’
Price War, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/08/opec-dealcollapse-sparks-price-war-20-oil-in-2020-is-coming.html [https://perma.cc/8FVF-FEPS].
10. In the U.S., these measures included, among other things, government-mandated
shutdowns of non-essential businesses (e.g., bars and restaurants), restrictions on international
travel, and banning large public gatherings (e.g., concerts, sporting events, etc.). Many state
and local governments issued “stay-at-home” or “shelter-in-place” orders in attempt to limit
public interaction, and many businesses required employees to work from home. See, e.g.,
AJMC Staff, A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan.
1,
2021),
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020
[https://perma.cc/B4DM-D7PZ]; Elvia Limon, Here's How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has
Unfolded
in
Texas
Since
March,
TEXAS
TRIB.
(July
31,
2020),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/07/31/coronavirus-timeline-texas/
[https://perma.cc/94FB-ECGT].
11. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 4.
12. Crude Oil Prices, supra note 1.
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30, 2020, WTI traded at $14.10.13 WTI prices continued to collapse in
April, due to concerns over a scarcity of available storage and low
demand for oil.14 Infamously, on April 20, 2020, WTI futures fell to the
lowest price in United States history at -$36.98.15 While prices improved
to nearly $50 by year-end 2020, price volatility and downward demand
trends proved catastrophic, resulting in roughly $145 billion in write
downs among United States and European exploration and production
companies.16
To make matters worse, natural gas fared little better than oil in
2020. As the U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) explained
in a July 13, 2020 report:
In the first half of 2020, natural gas prices at the U.S.
Henry Hub benchmark reached record lows. The average
monthly Henry Hub spot price in the first six months of
the year was $1.81 per million British thermal units
(MMBtu). Monthly prices reached a low of
$1.63/MMBtu in June, the lowest monthly inflationadjusted (real) price since at least 1989. Prices started the
year low because of mild winter weather, which resulted
in less natural gas demand for space heating. Beginning
in March, spring weather and the economic slowdown
induced by mitigation efforts for the coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) contributed to lower demand, further
lowering prices. 17

13. Id.
14. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, INTERIM STAFF REPORT, TRADING IN

NYMEX WTI CRUDE OIL FUTURES CONTRACT LEADING UP TO, ON, AND AROUND APRIL 20,
2020,
at
2–3
(2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/media/5296/InterimStaffReportNYMEX_WTICrudeOil/download
[https://perma.cc/GN2P-PMUG].
15. Catherine Ngai et al., Oil Plunges Below Zero for First Time in Unprecedented
Wipeout,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
19,
2020,
6:28
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-19/oil-drops-to-18-year-low-on-globaldemand-crunch-storage-woes [https://perma.cc/N4VP-5AAY].
16. Collin Eaton & Sarah McFarlane, 2020 Was One of the Worst-Ever Years for Oil WriteDowns, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/2020-was-oneof-the-worst-ever-years-for-oil-write-downs-11609077600 [https://perma.cc/X5T2-DTU8].
17. Kristen Tsai & Stephen York, U.S. Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Prices Reached
Record Lows in First Half of 2020, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 13, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=44337 [https://perma.cc/F65F-XAVK].
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Unsurprisingly, these compounding adverse market forces precipitated a
flood of oil and gas related bankruptcy filings. By October 22, 2020, at
least 84 oil and gas producers and oil field services companies had filed
for bankruptcy relief, seeking to administer a staggering $89 billion in
cumulative debt.18
Typically, when oil and gas prices plummet, oil and gas
producers face dramatic adjustments to their borrowing bases under
reserve-based loans.19 As prices fall, borrowers' collateral—chiefly their
mineral reserves—dramatically decrease in value. 20 Availability of credit
under reserve-based loans is typically tied to the value of the reserves
securing the loan, known as the borrowing base.21 When the value of
reserves declines, the borrowing base similarly declines, restricting a
borrower's available credit.22 Oil and gas producers therefore often file
for relief to address liquidity concerns caused by borrowing base
reductions.23
Recently, oil and gas borrowers have also used bankruptcy as a
means of restructuring or disposing of disadvantageous contracts. Those
efforts have led to a series of hotly contested and extensively litigated
challenges involving midstream gathering agreements, and whether those
gathering agreements granted midstream partners' real property interests
in upstream debtors' minerals.24 The implications of the rulings of those
18. Artem Abramaov & Lefteris Karaagiannopoulos, North American Oil and Gas
Bankruptcy Debt Reached an All Time High in 2020 and Is Set to Grow, RYSTAD ENERGY
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/northamerican-oil-and-gas-bankruptcy-debt-reached-an-all-time-high-in-2020-and-is-set-to-grow/
[https://perma.cc/37F8-F4DB].
19. Paul J O'Donnell & Carin Dehne-Kiley, Spring Reserve-Based Lending
Redeterminations Result in a Liquidity Squeeze for Speculative-Grade E&P Companies, S&P
GLOBAL
RATINGS
(June
22,
2020,
1:09
PM),
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200622-spring-reserve-basedlending-redeterminations-result-in-a-liquidity-squeeze-for-speculative-grade-e-p-compani11539901 [https://perma.cc/F4VT-MS54].
20. Id. A simple hypothetical proves this concept. If a borrower has 1,000 barrels of oil
reserves in the ground and can realize $100 per barrel, the borrower's reserves are worth
$100,000. If prices fall to $50 per barrel, the borrower's reserves are worth only $50,000.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. (at least two of the entities identified in Table 1, Extraction Oil & Gas Inc. and
Chesapeake Energy Corp., filed for bankruptcy relief and are subjects of this article).
24. In the context of oil and gas operations, “upstream” refers to the production of
hydrocarbons from the ground—these companies are often referred to as “exploration and
production” or “E&P” companies; “midstream” refers to the transportation, storage and
processing of hydrocarbons from the site of production to refineries and processing facilities;
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cases are expansive. As illustrated in recent decisions, a debtor’s ability
to reorganize may hinge on whether it can reject uneconomic gathering
agreements. Further, a court’s determination of whether a midstream
gathering agreement creates a real property interest can materially affect
whether an upstream debtor’s lender can recover fair value for its
collateral. In some instances, a gathering agreement may create a real
property interest so burdensome that the encumbered mineral estate may
have value only the midstream gatherer, regardless of whether a senior
secured lender has a lien against those assets. As one equally troubling
case shows, even a debtor’s successful rejection of a burdensome
midstream gathering agreement may leave lenders with few options for
repayment.
This article addresses, in detail, potential disputes between
upstream debtors and their midstream counterparties, key cases
discussing whether a debtor can reject economically disadvantageous
contracts, how the risks associated with midstream contracts affect
underwriting loans to upstream exploration and production companies,
and recent developments in case law affecting debtors' and lenders' rights
against midstream parties.
Because this article involves complex issues related to oil and gas
and bankruptcy law, Part II of this article of this article provides a brief
primer on the oil and gas industry, interests in minerals under state laws,
gathering agreements, and how executory contracts and other claims are
treated under bankruptcy law.25 Part III of this article addresses one of
the most influential recent cases concerning gathering agreements in
bankruptcy—In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation26—and why it was

and “downstream” refers to the refining and marketing of hydrocarbons for sale to consumers.
Adam Muspratt, Introduction to Oil and Gas Industry, OIL & GAS IQ (May 1, 2019),
https://www.oilandgasiq.com/strategy-management-and-information/articles/oil-gasindustry-an-introduction [https://perma.cc/3ZEL-7V77].
25. See infra Part II.
26. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Sabine Oil
& Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). Sabine involved two rulings of the
bankruptcy court. In the first ruling, the court authorized Sabine to reject its midstream
gathering agreements Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC and HPIP Gonzales Holdings,
LLC, but the court declined to make any final determination as to whether those gathering
agreements formed covenants running with the land. Sabine, 547 B.R. at 79–80. Sabine then
filed adversary proceedings against Nordheim and HPIP seeking a declaratory ruling that the
covenants did not run with the land. Sabine, 550 B.R. at 62. On appeal, both opinions were
affirmed by the district court, see In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
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beneficial to both upstream debtors and their lenders. 27 Part IV addresses
midstream companies' attempts to avoid the Sabine ruling, and two
important decisions—In re Alta Mesa Resources, Inc.28 and In re
Badlands Energy, Inc.29—that contradicted and declined to follow
Sabine.30 Part V addresses three decisions from 2020, 31 two of which
evidence a return to Sabine even despite the best efforts of midstream
gatherers to create real property interests in their upstream counterparties'
minerals.32 Part VI addresses the In re Southland Royalty Company33
conundrum, explains why an upstream debtor's ability to reject a
gathering agreement is not a cure-all that enables a successful
restructuring, and proposes a financing alternative that could cure some
of the uncertainty associated with gathering agreements and their effects
on senior encumbrances.34 Part VII summarizes and concludes this
article.35
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A.

Oil and Gas Basics: From Geology to Gasoline—Upstream,
Midstream, and Downstream Sectors

The oil and gas industry represents a full chain of businesses that,
together, locate, extract, refine, and sell petrochemical products to
businesses and consumers. Generally speaking, the oil and gas industry
can be broken into three discrete sectors: upstream; midstream; and
downstream. The Library of Congress provides a succinct description of
each of these sectors:

2017), and ultimately by the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, see In re Sabine Oil &
Gas Corp., 734 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2018).
27. See infra Part III.
28. 613 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019).
29. 608 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019).
30. See infra Part IV.
31. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 98 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re
Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020); In re Extraction Oil & Gas
Inc., 622 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
32. See infra Part V
33. 623 B.R. at 64.
34. See infra Part VI.
35. See infra Part VII.
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The upstream segment of the oil and gas industry contains
exploration activities, which include creating geological
surveys and obtaining land rights, and production
activities, which include onshore and offshore drilling.36
The midstream sector covers transportation, storage, and
trading of crude oil, natural gas, and refined products . . .
. [O]nce the oil has been extracted and separated from
natural gas, pipelines transport the products to another
carrier or directly to a refinery. 37
The downstream sector covers refining and marketing . .
. . [M]arketing is the wholesale and retail distribution of
refined petroleum products to business, industry,
government, and public consumers.38
Each of the sectors is heavily reliant on each other. An upstream
exploration and production company may locate, drill, and extract oil and
gas from a basin in Utah but if it does so, it needs both a purchaser and a
means to get its petrochemicals to a refinery, which may be in Texas or
some other faraway place. As a result, it is likely to enter into what is
commonly referred to as a “gathering agreement” with a midstream
partner. 39 Under that gathering agreement, the midstream partner gathers
extracted petrochemicals at storage tanks or at gas wellheads and
transports them to a downstream partner, collecting transportation fees
from the producer or purchasing and reselling the production downstream
at a profit (or both). 40 The downstream partner may then refine the
36. Upstream Production and Exploration, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://guides.loc.gov/oiland-gas-industry/upstream [https://perma.cc/CH8E-2X6P].
37. Midstream: Transportation, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://guides.loc.gov/oil-and-gasindustry/midstream [https://perma.cc/VD92-G868].
38. Downstream: Refining and Marketing, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://guides.loc.gov/oiland-gas-industry/downstream [https://perma.cc/R6QR-8G5E].
39. Energy Infrastructure Primer: A Guide for Both New and Experienced Investors,
ALERIAN (May 2019), https://www.alerian.com/wp-content/uploads/EI-Primer-May2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LEB-XGBW]; Daniel M. Kennedy, A Primer on Gathering and
Processing Agreements and Their Impact on Asset Value, NEWSL. (North Houston Ass’n of
Prof’l
Landmen,
Hou.,
Tex.),
Spring
2017,
at
3,
https://nhapl.org/resources/Documents/2017%20NHAPL%20Spring%20Newsletter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NUQ9-LYMS].
40. LIBR. OF CONGRESS, supra note 37.
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petrochemicals into clean natural gas and gasoline and sell them through
retail channels, including gas stations.
1. The Importance of Gathering Agreements
Upstream exploration and production companies may extract
minerals from the ground in a relatively isolated place, far from
developed infrastructure. 41 After petrochemicals are produced, they are
generally separated into oil, gas, and water, and must be further refined
before they are sold to their end users.42 But how do they get to a refinery
and to market? Produced crude oil is typically stored in large tanks near
the wellhead and can be moved by truck, rail, or pipeline thereafter. 43
Natural gas, on the other hand, is typically collected at the wellhead and
moved almost exclusively by pipeline either to a compression station or
other area where gas is aggregated and then moved through larger
pipelines to downstream partners.44
Developing pipelines for the transmission of petrochemicals is
costly and requires considerable planning and permitting to ensure the
efficient gathering, processing, pressurization, and pumping of
petrochemicals through the larger interstate pipeline system.45 As a
result, midstream companies typically require upstream companies to
enter into long-term gathering agreements before they will begin to
develop pipeline infrastructure to the upstream companies' well heads. 46
Gathering agreements establish the terms and conditions under
which the midstream company will purchase, process, and transport the
upstream company's petrochemicals. Most gathering agreements contain
a “dedication” in which the upstream company promises that all of its
minerals from certain geographic areas will be sold to the midstream

41. Jad Mouawad, Oil Explorers Searching Ever More Remote Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
9,
2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/09/business/worldbusiness/oil-explorerssearching-ever-more-remote-areas.html [https://perma.cc/27T5-ZCYY].
42. Energy Infrastructure Primer: A Guide for Both New and Experienced Investors, supra
note 39.
43. Id.
44. Kennedy, supra note 39.
45. Id.
46. Energy Infrastructure Primer: A Guide for Both New and Experienced Investors, supra
note 39.
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company and transported by the midstream company during the term of
the gathering agreement, which may be as long as twenty to thirty years. 47
A dedication in a gathering agreement essentially grants the
midstream company a monopoly to process, trade, and transport all of the
upstream company's petrochemicals from a specific area for a slated
period of time. This does two things: (1) it ensures the upstream company
will always have a buyer for extracted petrochemicals; and (2) ensures
the midstream company will have a revenue stream from all of the
petrochemicals extracted by the upstream company. The midstream
company can generally determine the volume of petrochemicals that the
upstream company is likely to extract during the term by analyzing the
upstream company's reserve reports and other pertinent data, and so have
a reasonable idea of the likely profits it might earn during the term of the
gathering agreement. Those profits are used to offset the cost of
constructing the pipeline infrastructure and linking the upstream
company's wells to the midstream company's pipeline system. The
monopolistic dedication is central to the business arrangement between
upstream and midstream entities and is used to mitigate risks of
nonpayment and to preclude competition from other midstream
companies.48
2. Interests in Minerals
Below is an actual example of a dedication from a gathering
agreement between an upstream exploration and production company
and its midstream partner:
Shipper dedicates to the performance of this Agreement
the Dedicated Properties and Dedicated Gas and grants to
Williams the exclusive right to Gather, Process,
Dehydrate and Treat the Produced Dedicated Gas
(“Dedication”). This Dedication shall be a covenant
running with the land under applicable law and binding
on the respective successors and assigns of the interests
of Shipper and its Affiliates in and to the Dedicated
Properties and Dedicated Gas. If applicable law requires
47. Id; Kennedy, supra note 39.
48. Kennedy, supra note 39.
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any amendment or modification to this Agreement for
this Dedication to be treated as an enforceable covenant
running with the land, the parties will promptly enter into
any such addendum or modification. Gatherer may file
memoranda of this Agreement substantially in the form
of Exhibit “J” in local land records from time to time in
its discretion, and Shipper will promptly enter into any
such memoranda upon request.49
The dedication includes a pledge of all of the upstream company's
minerals associated with certain leases or geographic areas. The
monopolistic pledge combined with the thirty-year term found in this
gathering agreement mitigates the midstream company's risk of loss
associated with developing its pipeline infrastructure to the upstream
company's wells.
Even so, the midstream company is not without risk. While the
dedication purports to convey an interest in minerals to the midstream
company, parties to this and similar gathering agreements have hotly
litigated just what type of interest in minerals was actually conveyed to
the midstream gatherer.50 As detailed in cases like Alta Mesa and
Extraction, addressed below, the nature of the interest conveyed in a
gathering agreement can materially affect the contract parties' rights in
bankruptcy.
There are two types of interests that can be conveyed by
dedications in gathering agreements: (1) real property interests or (2)
personal property interests. Rules differ by state for classifying oil and
gas interests as either real or personal property. Therefore, whether an
oil and gas leasehold interest constitutes a real or personal property
interest hinges on the case law of the particular state where the oil and
gas property is located. Under Texas law, for instance, an oil and gas
49. First Amended Complaint for Avoidance and Related Declaratory Relief, Exhibit B,
Gas Gathering, Processing, Dehydrating and Treating Agreement between Wamsutter LLC
and Southland Royalty Company LLC (the “Wamsutter L63 Agreement”) at § 1.1(a), In re
Southland Royalty Company, LLC Adv. Proc. No. 20-50551 (KBO) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13,
2020), Adv. D.I. 28.
50. See, e.g., In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re
Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019);In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608
B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019); In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 79 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2020); In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020); In re
Extraction Oil & Gas Inc., 622 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
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lease creates a determinable fee interest that vests the lessee with title to
the hydrocarbons thereunder. As explained by the Texas Supreme Court:
The term “lease,” when used in an oil and gas context, is
a misnomer. The estate created by the oil and gas lease
is not the same as those interests created under a “lease”
governed by the law of landlord and tenant.
The common oil and gas lease creates a determinable fee.
It vests the lessee with title to oil and gas in place. It
logically follows, and has long been held by this court,
that an oil and gas lease is a sale of an interest in land.51
Under Texas law, conveyances of minerals in the ground through a
mineral lease generally constitute conveyances of real property interests,
which typically cannot be rejected by a debtor in bankruptcy. 52 Kansas
law, however, is entirely different and “an oil and gas lease does not
create any present vested estate in the nature of title to the land which it
covers or to the oil and gas in place.”53 In other words, oil and gas leases
do not convey any interest in real property under Kansas law. Rather, the
lease “merely conveys a license to enter upon the land and explore for
such minerals and if they are discovered to produce and sever
them.”54 Consequently, Kansas oil and gas leases are considered
executory contracts that may be rejected under section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code.55

51. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982) (citations
omitted); see also Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. 2002)
(“A Texas mineral lease grants a fee simple determinable to the lessee.”).
52. In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d 727, 739 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1990) (“While we interpret the
Bankruptcy Code as a matter of federal law, state law determines whether these contracts
constitute unexpired leases subject to Section 365. In Texas, they do not. Instead, they convey
interests in real property. The term “oil and gas lease” is a misnomer because the interest
created by an oil and gas lease is not the same as an interest created by a lease governed by
landlord and tenant law. As the district court noted, the so-called leaseholds at issue in this
case actually constitute determinable fee interests.” (citations omitted)).
53. In re J. H. Land & Cattle Co., 8 B.R. 237, 239 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (quoting
Ingram v. Ingram, 214 Kan. 415, 521 P.2d 254, 257 (1974)).
54. Id.
55. Id. The “Bankruptcy Code” refers to title 11 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C. §§
101, et seq.
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Oil and gas interests are also affected by the distinction drawn
between hydrocarbons in the ground and those that have been extracted
or produced. As for the cases concerned herein, Texas, Utah, Oklahoma,
Colorado, and Wyoming all consider oil and gas hydrocarbons to be real
property while remaining in the ground, but personal property once
extracted from the ground.56 This distinction proved to be instrumental
in bankruptcy disputes over midstream gathering agreements.
The central question to this article is whether language that
purports to grant a midstream gatherer an interest in the upstream debtor's
in-ground minerals actually results in the conveyance of a real property
interest in those minerals. Generally speaking, it is much easier to convey
a personal property interest in minerals through a midstream dedication
than a real property interest, because midstream companies typically deal
only with personal property—i.e., extracted hydrocarbons. 57 An
upstream debtor's pledge to run all of its extracted minerals through the
midstream counterparty's pipeline creates contractual interests in the
upstream party's personal property—the extracted minerals—and creates
56. Texas: In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 547 B.R. 66, 77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). (“Under
Texas law, once minerals are extracted from the ground, such minerals cease to be real
property and instead become personal property.”) (citing Sabine Prod. Co. v. Frost Nat. Bank
of San Antonio, 596 S.W.2d 271, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v.
Hunt Energy Corp., 47 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App. 2000), pet. denied; Riley v. Riley, 972 S.W.2d
149, 155 (Tex. App. 1998); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th
Cir.1975); see also In re Estate of Ethridge, 594 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. App. 2019).
Utah: In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854, 869 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (“Under
Utah law, 'real property' includes non-extracted minerals.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-1(3)
(“'Real property' or 'real estate' means any right, title, estate, or interest in land, including all
nonextracted minerals located in, on, or under the land . . . .”).
Oklahoma: In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. 90, 99 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019).
(“Oklahoma draws a distinction between hydrocarbons resting beneath the ground and those
that have been extracted. Oil and gas is considered real property while it remains in the
ground. After the oil and gas is severed from the ground, it becomes personal property.”)
(citing Local Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Okla. City v. Eckroat, 186 Okla. 660, 100 P.2d 261,
263 (1940)).
Colorado: Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2018 COA 134, ¶ 26, aff'd on other grounds, 2020
CO 73, ¶ 26, 474 P.3d 46 (“'[W]hile in place, minerals are real property.'“) (quoting Smith v.
El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 720 P.2d 608, 609 (Colo. App. 1985)).
Wyoming: Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d
842, 845 (1942) (“It is true, of course, that when oil and gas have been brought to the surface,
they become personal property.”).
57. See, e.g., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment against Defendant, Grand Mesa Pipeline, LLC; And Defendant's Motion For
Permissive Abstention, at 17, In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y.
2017); In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., Case No. 20-11548 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 14,
2020), D.I. 834.
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what is, in essence, a services contract for a set term.58 Dedicating
minerals in a way that creates a real property interest is more complicated.
For example, in Wyoming and many other states,59 a dedication of
minerals can create a covenant that runs with the land only if four
elements are met: (1) the original covenant must be enforceable; (2) the
parties to the original covenant must have intended that the covenant run
with the land; (3) the covenant must “touch and concern” the land; and
(4) there must be privity of estate between the parties to the dispute.60
3. Why it Matters
The distinction between real and personal property interests in
minerals can be critical for an upstream debtor in bankruptcy and for a
midstream company as its creditor. While section 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code entitles bankrupt debtors to assume or reject executory contracts, it
does not enable a debtor to reject or otherwise avoid obligations arising
under a covenant that runs with the land. Covenants that run with the
land are not executory contracts and cannot be rejected.61
If a gathering agreement's dedication does not grant the
midstream company a real property interest in the upstream debtor's
minerals, the upstream debtor may reject the contract and seek to
negotiate more favorable terms with its midstream counterparty, or even
a new midstream competitor. If, however, the gathering agreement grants
the midstream company a real property interest, the upstream debtor is
bound to the gathering agreement even if its terms are so economically
penal due to changes in market conditions that the agreement will
preclude the debtor from successfully reorganizing or even selling its
interests in bankruptcy.

58. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 79 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
59. See, e.g., Noyes v. McDonnell, 1965 OK 16, 398 P.2d 838 (Okla. 1965) (applying same

elements under Oklahoma law); Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d
618, 623 (Utah 1989) (applying same elements under Utah law); see also LuMac Dev. Corp.
v. Buck Point Ltd. Partnership, 61 Ohio App. 3d 558, 562, 573 N.E.2d 681 (1988) (applying
same elements under Ohio law).
60. Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 9, 191 P.3d
125, 129 (Wyo. 2008) (citing elements for creation of covenant running with land).
61. See, e.g., Alta Mesa, 613 B.R. 90, 95.
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Restructuring and Gathering Agreements in Bankruptcy Cases
1. Bankruptcy Basics

In the United States, bankruptcy proceedings are governed by
what is commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, codified under
Title 11 of the United States Code.62 A debtor initiates a bankruptcy case
by filing a petition for bankruptcy relief with the bankruptcy court. 63 The
date on which a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy relief is known as
the “petition date”.64 Claims are treated differently under the Bankruptcy
Code depending on whether they arose prior to or after the petition date.65
This article focuses on bankruptcy cases in which upstream
debtors attempt to restructure their debts or reorganize their business
operations. Corporate reorganizations typically take place under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.66 A corporate debtor who files a petition for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code continues to operate its
business after the petition date as a “debtor-in-possession.”67 In a Chapter
11 bankruptcy case, a debtor may attempt to restructure debts and exit
bankruptcy as a going concern through a plan of reorganization, 68 or it
may liquidate its assets through a bankruptcy sale commonly known as a
“363 sale”.69
2. Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy
To facilitate reorganizations, the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors
to assume or reject economically disadvantageous executory contracts
and unexpired leases.70 While the term “executory contract” is not

62. 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2018).
63. Id. § 301(a) (“A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing

with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor
under such chapter.”).
64. See generally id. § 101.
65. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1116.
66. Id. § 1121.
67. Id. § 1107.
68. See generally, id. § 1129.
69. See generally, id. § 363.
70. See generally, id. § 365; see also PRACTICAL LAW BNKR. & RESTRUCTURING &
PRACTICAL LAW FIN., EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND LEASES: OVERVIEW (2020), Thompson
Reuters Practical Law 8-381-2672.
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defined under the Bankruptcy Code, it has been oft described by
bankruptcy courts as “a contract under which the obligation of both the
bankrupt [debtor] and the other party to the contract are so far
unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”71 In
its simplest form, an executory contract is a contract pursuant to which
both parties have continuing duties and obligations.
Certain categories of contracts may not be assumed or rejected
under the Bankruptcy Code, either because they are not executory or
because they create some type of non-extinguishable interest. For
example, at least one court has ruled that a contract that conveys an
interest in real property, or that creates a covenant running with the land,
cannot be rejected in bankruptcy72—a concept particularly relevant to this
article. Additionally, loans or other financing arrangements are generally
not executory contracts subject to assumption or rejection because the
lender has no substantial performance obligations remaining.73
Financing agreements are not executory contracts if the only performance
that remains is repayment. 74 Security agreements are likewise not
executory where the security interest thereunder has fully vested.75
71. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL, CIVIL RESOURCES MANUAL ch. 59, ¶ II,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-59-executory-contracts-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/D35V-LL98] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021) (citing Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 Minn. L. R. 439, 460 (1973)); In re Murexco Petroleum,
Inc., 15 F.3d 60 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Texscan Corp., 976 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Floyd, 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989); Sharon Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas
Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Speck, 798 F.2d 279, 279-80 (8th Cir.
1986); Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d 1020,
1021 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Chateaugay Corp., 130 B.R. 162, 164 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
72. In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854, 875 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (“Because the
Agreements are covenants that run with the land under Utah law, Section 365 is simply not
available.”); Sabine, 567 B.R. 869, 874 (“[I]t is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant
that “runs with the land,” since such a covenant creates a property interest that is not
extinguished through bankruptcy.”).
73. In re Cox, 179 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995) (“Under the SmartBuy Contract,
the parties do not have substantial obligations outstanding because the only performance
remaining is the repayment of GMAC under the Contract.”).
74. Id. (“A note is not an executory contract if the only performance that remains is
repayment.”); In re Texstone Venture, Ltd., 54 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (“The
legislative history of § 365 indicates that a note is not an executory contract if the only
performance that remains is repayment.”).
75. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tennessee Bank Nat. Ass'n, 826 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.
1987) (“[I]n the present case, the security interest granted to LSC to secure Metler's obligation
under the leases was fully vested. The consideration for the grant of the security interest was
the lessor agreeing to lease the cranes to Metler and LSC agreeing to take an assignment of
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While there are exceptions to a debtor's ability to assume an
executory contract like those mentioned above, a debtor may typically
assume an executory contract by (1) curing any outstanding defaults and
(2) providing the counterparty adequate assurance of future
performance. 76 In other words, the debtor must pay what it owes, and
prove that it can pay obligations under the contract as they come due in
the future. Importantly, if a debtor is going to assume a contract, it must
assume all of the terms of the contract. 77 A debtor cannot assume only
beneficial provisions of an executory contract or reject adverse
provisions. It must assume or reject the contract in its entirety.
Alternatively, a debtor can reject the executory contract.
Rejection is treated as a statutory breach of contract and gives rise to a
claim for rejection damages.78 A creditor's rejection damages claim is
treated as a pre-petition general unsecured claim and is paid near the very
bottom of the bankruptcy claims payment hierarchy detailed below.79
A debtor's ability to assume or reject executory contracts is,
therefore, a powerful weapon.80 It can, in effect, convert costly future
the leases. Thus, the security interest was non-executory and therefore not subject to the
rejection power of the trustee.”).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2018).
77. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1984) (“Should the debtor-inpossession elect to assume the executory contract, however, it assumes the contract cum onere
. . . .”); In re Texstone Venture, Ltd., 54 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (“It is elementary
that if a contract is to be rejected, it must be rejected in whole and not in part. Thus, the Debtor
cannot retain those aspects of the contract to his benefit while rejecting the burdensome
aspects of the contract. 'It is axiomatic that an assumed contract under Section 365 is
accompanied by all of its provisions and conditions . . . a debtor may not retreat to this
provision, derived from the inherent equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts to avoid an
obligation while it enjoys a benefit which arises in conjunction with that obligation.'“)
(quoting In re Holland Enterprises, Inc., 25 B.R. 301, 303 (E.D.N.C., 1982)).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (“Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section,
the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of
such contract or lease . . . .”); In re FBI Distribution Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2003)
(“If the contract is rejected, . . . the contract is deemed breached on the date 'immediately
before the date of the filing of the petition . . . .'“).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g); Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(g), 507)
(“Damages on the contract that result from the rejection of an executory contract … must be
administered through bankruptcy and receive the priority provided general unsecured
creditors.”); FBI Distribution Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 42 (citing to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1)
regarding rejection damages) (“[T]he nondebtor party has a prepetition general unsecured
claim for breach of contract damages, one not entitled to administrative priority.”).
80. See, e.g., Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir.
1985) (“[Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code] provides a means whereby a debtor can force
others to continue to do business with it when the bankruptcy filing might otherwise make
them reluctant to do so.”).
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obligations into pre-petition general unsecured claims likely to be paid
pennies on the dollar.81 As a result, debtors often threaten rejection in
order to obtain contractual concessions, price improvements, and
favorable lease amendments before agreeing to assume the contract.82 If
those threats fail, debtors may simply reject uneconomical executory
contracts and move on.
3. Claim Payment Hierarchy: The Waterfall of Funds 83
In most Chapter 11 reorganizations, there are insufficient funds
to pay all creditors in full. Whether a creditor is paid in full, pennies on
the dollar, or not at all, generally depends on what type of claim the
creditor has. Claims are paid according to a statutory hierarchy under the
Bankruptcy Code often referred to as the “absolute priority rule.”84 The
absolute priority rule provides that all creditors holding a claim of a type
higher up the claim hierarchy must be paid in full before any creditor
holding a claim of a type lower on the hierarchy is paid anything.85
Atop the claim hierarchy are claims secured by collateral that
were properly perfected as of the petition date.86 The Bankruptcy Code
provides that such claims must be paid up to the value of the collateral. 87
If, however, an alleged secured claim was not perfected on the petition
date, a debtor or trustee may be able to avoid any alleged lien,88 thus
81. For example, as further discussed herein, Southland Royalty Company's ability to
reorganize in Chapter 11 hinged almost exclusively on rejected its burdensome midstream
gathering agreements in order to generate any interest in its assets from potential buyers.
82. See, e.g., Debtors’ Omnibus Reply to Objections to the Third Amended Joint Plan of
Reorganization of Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation and its Subsidiary Debtors, at ¶ 1417, In re Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation, Case No. 16-11566 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del.
Mar. 8, 2017), D.I. 807 (discussing debtors' alleged “'high stakes strategy' of threatening
rejection to bring about negotiations” to revise their midstream agreements).
83. Author John Kane thanks his former partner Jason Binford for his assistance preparing
this synopsis of the claim payment hierarchy in bankruptcy cases.
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
85. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savs. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
442 (1999); Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115–16 (1939), superseded by
statute as stated in In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 95 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing
Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 552 (1889)).
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
87. See id. § 506(a)(1) (providing that a creditor’s claim is secured up to the value of the
underlying collateral); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (discussing how secured claims must be treated in
a plan of reorganization). Generally speaking, secured creditors are not entitled to full
payment for the amount of their claim in excess of the collateral’s value. See id. § 506.
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).
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sending the creditor plummeting down the hierarchy to join the ranks of
the unsecured creditors.
Administrative expense claims sit just below secured claims on
the claim hierarchy.89 Administrative expense claims arise out of the
administration of the debtor's business post-petition, and include
professional fees, post-petition rent, and post-petition operational
expenses. 90 Payment of administrative expense claims is critical to a
successful reorganization and must, by statute, be paid in full upon
confirmation of a plan of reorganization.91 If a debtor cannot pay its
administrative expense claims, it is deemed administratively insolvent,
and cause exists to convert a reorganization into a Chapter 7 liquidation.92
Immediately junior to administrative expense claims are priority
93
claims. Priority claims are unsecured claims that Congress decided that
debtors should pay before other types of unsecured claims. 94 These
include certain wage claims payable to the debtor's employees, certain
taxes, and claims payable for public policy reasons, such as alimony and
child support.95
Unsecured claims that do not fall into any of priority categories
are known as “general unsecured claims.”96 General unsecured claims
may consist of things like unpaid pre-petition trade debt, unpaid prepetition rent, or rejection damages claims.97 General unsecured claims
typically make up a large portion of the debts owed by a bankrupt debtor
but, because they are junior to nearly all other classes of claims, they are
typically paid only pennies on the dollar, if anything at all.98
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).
90. See id. (administrative expenses include “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of

preserving the estate” including certain post-petition costs and expenses, and professional fees
awarded under 11 U.S.C. § 330, among others).
91. See id. § 1129(a)(9).
92. See id. § 1112(b)(4)(A). Cause includes “substantial or continuing loss to or diminution
of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.” A debtor cannot
“rehabilitate” or reorganize if it cannot pay all allowed administrative expense claims on the
effective date of a plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9).
93. Id. § 507(a); see also id. § 503.
94. See id. § 507.
95. Id.
96. See id. §§ 506–507 (referred to as “general” unsecured claims to differentiate them
from “priority” unsecured claims because they receive no special treatment under the
Bankruptcy Code.)
97. See § 502(g).
98. See id. § 1129(b); and see Baird, Bris & Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small
Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study, AM. BANKR. INST. (Nov. 2005) (discussing
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Finally, at the very bottom of the claim hierarchy are the debtor's
equity interest holders.99 Equity interest holders receive distributions
from the estate only in the rare event that all other creditors are paid in
full, plus post-petition interest.100
4. The Executory Contract Battleground
As noted above, if a gathering agreement grants a midstream
company a real property interest in the upstream debtor's minerals, the
debtor cannot reject the gathering agreement. 101 As a result, the debtor
must continue post-petition performance under the gathering agreement.
The upstream debtor's post-petition obligations under the gathering
agreement are administrative expenses 102 which must be paid in full for
the debtor to effectuate a reorganization.103 Moreover, if the midstream
party to the gathering agreement is a beneficiary of a covenant running
with the land, its interests attach to minerals in the ground. As a result, it
must receive those minerals once extracted as required by the gathering
agreement, thereby securing a future revenue stream. Midstream parties
to gathering agreements therefore have a vested interest in obtaining a
real property interest in the upstream debtor's minerals and vigorously
contesting whether their gathering agreement is subject to rejection.

distribution percentages to unsecured creditors in chapter 11 reorganizations)
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/priority.pdf [https://perma.cc/PHB4-DMPM].
99. Id. § 726(a)(6).
100. See id.; see also In re La. Indus. Coatings, Inc., 31 B.R. 688, 697 (Bankr. E.D. La.
1983).
101. See In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854, 875 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (“Because
the Agreements are covenants that run with the land under Utah law, Section 365 is simply
not available.”); see also In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(“[I]t is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant that “runs with the land,” since such a
covenant creates a property interest that is not extinguished through bankruptcy.”).
102. In re Applied Theory Corp., 312 B.R. 225, 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Section
503(b) allows administrative expense treatment for 'the actual, necessary costs and expenses
of preserving the estate. . . for services rendered after the commencement of the case.' . . .
[A]n expense is administrative only if it arises out of a transaction between the creditor and
the bankrupt's trustee or debtor in possession, and 'only to the extent that the consideration
supporting the claimant's right to payment was both supplied to and beneficial to the debtorin-possession in the operation of the business.'“) (citation omitted).
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (requiring claims under Bankruptcy Code sections
507(a)(2)—i.e., administrative claims under section 503(b)—to be paid in full on the effective
date of the plan in order for the plan to be confirmed); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2).
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By contrast, upstream debtors in bankruptcy benefit greatly if
they have the flexibility to reject a gathering agreement as an executory
contract. 104 If the terms of the gathering agreement become financially
punitive due to market volatility or pricing issues, as they did in 2020,
debtors may wish to reject the contract and either seek a new midstream
partner or negotiate an updated “market” gathering agreement that offers
reduced volume requirements and economic terms that account for
depressed prices.105 While rejection of a gathering agreement may give
rise to a massive rejection damages claim in favor of the midstream party,
that claim is treated as a general unsecured claim and may receive only a
small fraction of its face value, if anything at all.106
Unsurprisingly, as oil and gas prices precipitously declined in
2020, some upstream debtors' gathering agreements grew increasingly
financially onerous. Multiple upstream debtors were left with little
choice but to file for bankruptcy relief and sue to reject those gathering
agreements as executory contracts.107 In three recent decisions,108 the
debtors' ability to restructure hinged on whether gathering agreements

104. See supra note 81 regarding Southland's need to reject its gathering agreements in
order for its reserve to be marketable.
105. See Debtors’ Omnibus Reply to Objections to the Third Amended Joint Plan of
Reorganization of Triangle USA Petroleum Corporation and its Subsidiary Debtors, supra
note 82, at ¶ 3 (“The Debtors are saddled with substantially higher lease operating expenses .
. . because much of their oil and gas production is “dedicated” to Caliber at above-market
rates pursuant to the Specified Caliber Contracts. The Debtors negotiated the Specified
Caliber Contracts during a period of strong commodity prices and rapid production growth .
. . . The Specified Caliber Contracts . . . do not reflect the precipitous decline in commodity
prices . . ., [placing] the Debtors at a systematic competitive disadvantage. The rejection or
renegotiation of the Specified Caliber Contracts therefore remains an important restructuring
objective.”).
106. See, e.g., Order Confirming Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization
of Chesapeake Energy Corporation and its Debtor Affiliates at Exhibit A, Fifth Amended
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Chesapeake Energy Corporation and its Debtor
Affiliates, In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2020)
Case No. 20-33233. D. I. 2915. Chesapeake's confirmed chapter 11 plan provided for a
maximum five percent (5%) recover to holders of unsecured claims (in addition to equity
interest in the reorganized entity). Id.
107. Allison Good, As Upstream Bankruptcies Loom, Oil and Gas Pipelines Brace for
Contract
Disputes,
S&P
GLOBAL
MKT.
INTEL.
(June
17,
2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/asupstream-bankruptcies-loom-oil-and-gas-pipelines-brace-for-contract-disputes-58985313
[https://perma.cc/5GVW-H9ZR].
108. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re Southland
Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622
B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2020).
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were executory contracts subject to rejection, or were instead real
property covenants burdening the debtors' mineral interests. Before
analyzing those cases, it is important to first understand the progression
of both case law and dedication language in gathering agreements that
led to such hotly contested litigation and three significant rulings in 2020.
III. IN RE SABINE OIL & GAS CORPORATION: GATHERING AGREEMENTS AS
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
From approximately 2011 through mid-2014, United States crude
oil prices were favorable, and often exceeded $100 per barrel. 109 Towards
the end of 2014, however, prices precipitously dropped as global
production exceeded demand due in part to considerably increased
production by United States' shale oil producers. 110 As prices declined,
many upstream entities filed for bankruptcy relief as production became
unprofitable.111 One such entity was Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation
(“Sabine”).112
A.

Sabine's Contractual Dedications

Prior to filing for bankruptcy relief, Sabine, an upstream
exploration and production company, entered into gathering agreements
with HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC (“HPIP”) and Nordheim Eagle Ford
Gathering, LLC (“Nordheim”), its midstream counterparties, for the
collection, processing, and transportation of oil, gas, gas condensate, and
water produced from Sabine's wells.113 Sabine's gathering agreements
with HPIP and Nordheim were very similar. In each Nordheim gathering
agreement Sabine “dedicate[d] for gathering and dehydration … all [gas
and condensate] produced and saved … from wells … located within the
109. Hanna Breul, Crude Oil Prices Down Sharply in Fourth Quarter of 2014, U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Jan.
6,
2015),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19451 [https://perma.cc/4TM3-NLY5].
110. Id.
111. Matt Egan, U.S. Oil Bankruptcies Spike 379%, CNN BUSINESS (Feb. 11, 2016, 10:59
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/02/11/investing/oil-prices-bankruptcies-spike/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ZQN6-7YUK].
112. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff'd, 567
B.R. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd, 734 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2018).
113. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd, 734 F. App'x
64 (2d Cir. 2018).
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Dedicated Area…”114 As summarized by the court, the Nordheim
gathering agreements obligated Sabine to deliver “all of the gas and
condensate it produced from a particular area to Nordheim.”115 In
addition, the Nordheim agreements contemplated an additional
conveyance of land from Sabine to Nordheim on which Norheim would
construct its gathering facilities and pipelines.116
Under the HPIP agreements, “HPIP agreed to perform gathering
services with respect to all of the oil, gas, and water produced by Sabine
from a 'Dedicated Area' over which Sabine held certain leases, and to
construct the facilities required for those services.”117 As a key part of
those agreements, Sabine “dedicate[d] and commit[ted] to the
performance of this Agreement and the Leases and all of [Sabine]'s
owned or controlled Production produced and saved from [Sabine]'s
operated Wells located on the Leases” and “covenant[ed] to deliver the
same to [HPIP].”118
Under the Nordheim and HPIP agreements, the parties agreed
that Sabine would retain title to the mineral leases in question, but that
each gathering agreement established a “real right and covenant running
with the lands and the leasehold interests” covered by the dedication, and
that the gathering agreements would be “binding on the parties'
successors.”119
B.

The Rejection Battleground: Covenant Running with the Land
or Executory Contract?

Two months after filing for bankruptcy relief, Sabine moved to
reject the Nordheim gathering agreements as economically
disadvantageous executory contracts. 120 After preliminary hearings,
Sabine's motion was converted into an adversary proceeding—a fullfledged lawsuit in bankruptcy court—to litigate whether the gathering

114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 873; In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 61–62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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agreements were executory contracts subject to rejection, or covenants
running with the land binding on the debtor and its successors. 121
As explained by the court in Sabine, the distinction between
whether dedication language in a gathering agreement establishes a real
or personal property interest “is significant, because if the agreements
constitute real covenants that run with the land they are not 'executory
contracts' and the Bankruptcy Court does not have authority to approve
their rejection under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).”122 The Sabine courts
recognized that determining whether an agreement created real property
interest was a matter of state law.123 As a result, the New York courts
complied with the choice of law provisions of each of the gathering
agreements and applied Texas law.124
Under Texas law, a covenant, like a dedication in a gathering
agreement, runs with the land if: (1) it touches and concerns the land; (2)
it relates to a thing in existence or specifically binds the parties and their
assigns; (3) it is intended by the original parties to run with the land; and
(4) the successor to the burden has notice.125 In Sabine, the parties agreed
that the gathering agreements satisfied the second, third, and fourth
elements of the Texas “running with the land” test.126 As a result, the
Sabine courts focused on the first element, and whether, while not
expressly enumerated, the Texas test also requires “horizontal privity”
between the parties to the purported covenant running with the land.127

121. Sabine, 550 B.R. at 61–62.
122. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F. App'x 64, 65 (2d Cir. 2018).
123. Id. at 65–66 (“Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some

federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding.”) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 66 (citing Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635
(Tex. 1987)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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1. Horizontal Privity
Horizontal privity is an element required to establish that a
covenant runs with the land in many states.128 In Sabine, the Second
Circuit explains horizontal privity as follows:
In order for the parties to the original agreement to have
been in horizontal privity with one another, there must
have been some common interest in the land other than
the purported covenant itself at the time it was executed.
Horizontal privity typically exists when the original
covenanting parties make their covenant in connection
with the conveyance of an estate in fee from one of the
parties to the other. The covenant and the conveyance
must be made at the same time, although no continuing
mutual relationship to the affected land is needed. 129
In other words, a conveyance of the property subject to the encumbrance
must occur at the time of the creation of the encumbrance, or the
encumbrance—the covenant—does not run with the land.130
HPIP and Nordheim vehemently argued that two leading Texas
Supreme Court cases failed to list horizontal privity as an element of the
“running with the land” test.131 Though recognizing a growing trend
“towards the abolition of the horizontal privity requirement,” the Second
Circuit found Texas authority requiring horizontal privity, and that no
later Texas case eliminated the requirement.132
128. See, e.g., In re Murray Energy Holdings Co., Case No. 19-56885, 2020 WL 4037248,
at * 11 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2020) (applying West Virginia law); Flying Diamond Oil Corp.
v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 623 (Utah 1989)) (applying Utah law); Noyles v.
McDonnell, 398 P.2d 838 (Okla. 1965) (applying Oklahoma law); Jackson Hole Racquet Club
Resort v. Teton Pines Ltd. P’ship, 839 P.2d 951, 958 (applying Wyoming law); Taylor v.
Melton, 274 P.2d 977, 988–89 (Colo. 1954) (applying Colorado law).
129. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F. App'x 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2018).
130. See id.
131. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (recognizing
that HPIP and Nordheim’s argued that neither Inwood nor Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982), among others, expressly include horizontal privity
as an element necessary to establish a covenant running with the land).
132. Sabine, 734 Fed. App’x. at 66–67 (“It would be improper for us to read a traditional
requirement of real covenants out of Texas state law when there is no Texas law instructing
courts to do so. Accordingly, we agree with the bankruptcy court and find that horizontal
privity remains a requirement of Texas real covenants.”) (citation omitted).
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The Sabine courts then analyzed whether there was evidence of
horizontal privity in the HPIP and Nordheim gathering agreements.
When analyzing those agreements, the Sabine court noted that the
agreements dedicated interests in minerals that were “produced and
saved.”133 The court further observed that the term “produced and saved”
referred only to “minerals extracted from the ground.”134 Moreover, the
terms of each gathering agreement expressly disclaimed the sale, transfer,
or assignment of Sabine's interest in its mineral leases. 135 The court in
Sabine ruled that, as a result, there was no conveyance of an interest in
Sabine's minerals in the gathering agreement to go along with the pledges
in the dedication.136 With no concurrent conveyance of any real property
interest purportedly burdened by the covenant, the covenant could not run
with the land.137
2. Touch and Concern the Land
Having determined that horizontal privity is a necessary element
for a covenant running with the land under Texas law, and that the
gatherers failed to prove it, the Second Circuit did not address the first
element of Texas's “running with the land” test.138 The lower courts did,
however, and determined that the HPIP and Nordheim agreements did
not touch and concern the land.139 The district court noted that Texas
courts apply two tests when determining whether a covenant touches and
concerns the land:
First, a covenant touches and concerns the land if it
affects the nature, quality or value of the thing demised,
independently of collateral circumstances, or if it affects
the mode of enjoying it. Second, a covenant touches and
concerns the land either if the promisor's legal relations
in respect to the land in question are lessened or if the

133. Sabine, 550 B.R. at 66.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 70 and n.53.
136. Sabine, 734 Fed. Appx. at 66 (adopting bankruptcy court’s analysis).
137. Id. at 67.
138. Id.
139. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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promisee's legal relations in respect to that land are
increased.140
Meeting either of the tests satisfies the “touches and concerns the land”
element of the “running with the land” test.141
In finding that the agreements did not “touch and concern the
land” the district court again noted that the dedications in the gathering
agreements pertained only to extracted minerals, and that nothing in the
agreements would enable HPIP or Nordheim to interfere in any way with
Sabine's in-ground minerals.142 Moreover, the district court noted that
even if the agreements made Sabine's mineral interests “more or less
valuable, depending on the price of hydrocarbons and the market rates for
gather …those factors are clearly collateral …and would affect the value
of any oil-producing land.”143 The agreements therefore failed the first
“touches and concerns” test.
The district court similarly rejected HPIP and Nordheim's
contention that the agreements lessened Sabine's “legal relations in
respect to the land in question” or increased the gatherer's “legal relations
in respect to” the land in question.144 While the court issued a detailed
ruling addressing each of HPIP and Nordheim's legal arguments, its
reasoning is straightforward and simple: the agreements dedicated only
extracted minerals, which is personal property and, as a result, there is no
land—or any other real property interest—in question.145
The
agreements, as written, could not therefore affect the parties' legal
interests in Sabine's in-ground minerals. 146 Thus, even if the Sabine
courts did not apply horizontal privity, the gatherers could still not
establish that the agreements were covenants running with the land under
Texas law.

140. Id. at 874.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 876–77.
143. Id. at 877.
144. Id. at 876.
145. Id. at 874–75.
146. See id.
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Sabine Takeaway: The Importance of Extracted Minerals

Fundamentally, the Sabine decisions all hinged on the fact that
the gathering agreements in question pledged only minerals that were
“produced and saved” from dedicated leases.147 The gatherers could not
establish horizontal privity because Sabine never conveyed any interests
in its in-ground minerals.148 Moreover, the gathering agreements
contained express language stating that Sabine was not transferring any
title to its mineral leases or in-ground minerals.149 Further, the gathering
agreements did not bestow on HPIP or Nordheim any ability to extract
minerals from Sabine's wells or to affect Sabine's production volume.150
Taken as a whole, Sabine merely promised that it would allow HPIP and
Nordheim to process and transport its extracted minerals for a contractual
fee. The agreements did not give rise to any covenant running with any
land or other real property interest.
IV. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE: IN RE BADLANDS ENERGY, INC. & IN RE ALTA
MESA RESOURCES, INC.
A.

Drafting Dynamics: “Curing” the Personal Property Problem

In the aftermath of Sabine, midstream gatherers took affirmative
steps to protect their interests by drafting around the “produced and
saved” language that led to Sabine's rejection of the HPIP and Nordheim
agreements.151 Wamsutter LLC, a midstream gatherer referred to as
“Williams” in its agreements, presents a prime example because its
gathering agreements were later the subject of litigation in the In re

147. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 66–68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
148. Id. at 68–70.
149. Id. at 66–68.
150. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
151. Mark L. Jones et al., Bankruptcy Courts Contemplate Debtors' Rejection of Real

Property Covenants in Midstream Contracts, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=353cd8c2-6720-424c-ad4b-756fac28d575
[https://perma.cc/4YU9-E5Y4] (“Over the past four years, midstream firms have struggled to
adapt their long-standing practices and adjust their long-held expectations, which were
fundamentally disrupted by the outcome of the landmark bankruptcy case, In re Sabine Oil &
Gas. Midstream providers have since developed and relied on certain mechanisms and
carefully drafted contract language in order to bind upstream companies and their successors
in interest to obligations and restrictions contained of midstream agreements.”).
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Southland Royalty Company LLC bankruptcy case.152 Wamsutter's first
agreement, known as the L60 gathering agreement, is dated June 1, 2016
and likely drafted before the issuance of the Sabine bankruptcy court's
ruling just weeks prior.153 The “Shipper's Dedication” contained in the
L60 gathering agreement simply states: “Shipper dedicates Shipper's Gas
within the Area of Interest described in Exhibit B to Williams for
Gathering, Processing, Dehydrating and Treating.”154 Given the
simplicity of the language, it would be hard to imagine the Sabine court
determining that the dedication or agreement established a covenant
running with the land.
The second gathering agreement, known as the L63 gathering
agreement, became effective November 1, 2018, months after the Second
Circuit affirmed Sabine's rejection of the HPIP and Nordheim
agreements.155 The “Shipper's Dedication” contained in the L63 is
considerably more expansive, and states, in pertinent part:
Shipper dedicates to the performance of this Agreement
the Dedicated Properties and Dedicated Gas and grants to
Williams the exclusive right to Gather, Process,
Dehydrate and Treat the Produced Dedicated Gas
(“Dedication”). This Dedication shall be a covenant
running with the land under applicable law and binding
on the respective successors and assigns of the interests
of Shipper and its Affiliates in and to the Dedicated
Properties and Dedicated Gas. If applicable law requires
any amendment or modification to this Agreement for
this Dedication to be treated as an enforceable covenant
running with the land, the parties will promptly enter into
any such addendum or modification. Gatherer may file
memoranda of this Agreement substantially in the form
of Exhibit “J” in local land records from time to time in
152. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 71–72 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
153. See First Amended Complaint for Avoidance and Related Declaratory Relief at

Exhibit A Gas Gathering, Processing, Dehydrating and Treating Agreement dated June 1,
2016 between Wamsutter LLC and Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, In re Southland Royalty
Co. LLC 623 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2020) [hereinafter “Wamsutter L60
Agreement”].
154. Id. at Ex. A § 1.1.
155. See id. at Ex. B.
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its discretion, and Shipper will promptly enter into any
such memoranda upon request.156
It is abundantly clear from the plain language of the L63 dedication that
Wamsutter, the gatherer, intended the agreement to be a covenant running
with the land.
The definitions of “Dedicated Properties” and “Dedicated Gas”
further illustrate Wamsutter's efforts to concretely establish a covenant
running with the land after Sabine. Dedicated Properties “means all
interests owned or Controlled by Shipper …during the term of this
Agreement in oil, Gas or mineral leases covering lands …within the
Dedication Area.”157 The term Dedicated Gas means “all Gas owned or
Controlled by Shipper …in and under the Dedicated Properties before it
has been produced ….”158 Wamsutter makes clear that Southland is
agreeing to dedicate Wamsutter an interest in its minerals that are in the
ground in an effort to “touch and concern” the land, that both parties
intend to create a covenant running with the land, and that the covenant
is binding on all successors and assigns.
Like Wamsutter, other midstream companies similarly amended
gathering agreements in an effort to ensure they established covenants
running with the land.159 Those efforts were, at least for a while,
vindicated. In the years following Sabine, courts issued two impactful
rulings suggesting that with careful drafting, gathering agreements could
indeed establish real property interests in favor of midstream gatherers. 160
B.

In re Alta Mesa Resources: Covenant Running with Land161

On September 11, 2019, Alta Mesa Holdings, LP and Oklahoma
Energy Acquisitions, LP (collectively “Alta Mesa”) filed petitions for
bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.162 Alta

156. Id. at Ex. B § 1.1(a) (emphasis added).
157. Id. at Ex. J § 1(g).
158. Id. at Ex. J § 1(f) (emphasis added).
159. Jones et al., supra note 151.
160. In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019); In re Alta Mesa

Resources, Inc., 613 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019).
161. Unless otherwise noted herein, the definitions and meanings of terms provided in this
section IV.C. shall not apply to other sections of this article.
162. Alta Mesa, 613 B.R. at 90, 95.
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Mesa was an upstream oil and gas exploration and production
company.163 In 2015, Alta Mesa entered into oil and gas gathering
agreements with a midstream counterparty, Kingfisher Midstream, LLC
(“Kingfisher”), to ensure it could take its produced minerals to market.164
In each of the Kingfisher gathering agreements, Alta Mesa
dedicated to Kingfisher “all Interests within the Dedicated Area” which,
in context, meant all of Alta Mesa's “produced hydrocarbons.”165 The
agreements also (1) conveyed to Kingfisher “any easement or rights-ofway for purposes of constructing, owning, operating, repairing, replacing
and maintaining” any portion of the gathering systems, (2) declared that
the agreements were “covenants running with the land,” and (3) required
the parties to cause any successors to acknowledge the dedications and
agreements in writing.166
On December 1, 2016—months after Sabine—Alta Mesa and
Kingfisher entered into amendments to the gathering system.167 The
amendments expanded the gathering agreements to include additional
interests and the development of the Kingfisher gathering agreement. 168
Significantly, the amendments also incorporated a “Conveyance of
Transportation Right, which the parties intended to be a conveyance of a
portion of [Alta Mesa's] real property interests.”169 That right constituted
“the sole and exclusive right to transport [oil and gas] produced from”
Alta Mesa's dedicated interests. 170
Unfortunately for Alta Mesa, the Kingfisher gathering
agreements required payment of what Alta Mesa described as exorbitant
fees. 171 After filing for bankruptcy relief, Alta Mesa promptly moved to
reject the Kingfisher gathering agreements as executory contracts,

163. Id. at 95.
164. Id. at 95-96.
165. Id. at 96, 103.
166. Id. at 96.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 97 (internal quotations omitted).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 98 (“At the heart of this dispute is Alta Mesa's belief that its owners, sitting

on both sides of the negotiation table, agreed to pay Kingfisher exorbitant gathering fees.
According to Alta Mesa, its value as a going concern will increase if it is able to renegotiate
its gathering arrangements, either with Kingfisher or a third party.”).
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determining that doing so would improve its prospects of
reorganization.172
The Kingfisher gathering agreements each related to operations
in Oklahoma, and, as a result, the Alta Mesa court applied Oklahoma law
to determine whether the gathering agreements were covenants running
with the land.173 As the Alta Mesa court detailed, three factors are
required to create a real property covenant that runs with the land under
Oklahoma law: (1) the burden or benefit must “touch and concern” the
land; (2) there must be privity of estate between the party claiming the
benefit and the party upon whom the burden rests; and (3) the original
covenanting parties must have intended to bind successors. 174 The court
notes that in Oklahoma, “[r]eal property covenants are those that are so
connected to the underlying land that the benefit and burden pass to
successors by operation of law.”175 Oklahoma law does not require any
“magic words” to create a real property covenant but instead focuses on
the intent of the covenanting parties.176
It is important to note that the court in Alta Mesa recognized
repeatedly that, like Sabine, the dedications in the Kingfisher gathering
agreements involved only “produced” minerals.177 Further, the court
recognized that the test for determining whether a covenant runs with the
land in Oklahoma mirrors the Texas test applied in Sabine.178 Even so, in
a scathing review of Sabine, the Alta Mesa court distinguished the facts
between the cases and ruled that the Kingfisher gathering agreements
were covenants running the with land and not subject to rejection. 179

172. Id.
173. Id. at 99.
174. Id. at 99–100.
175. Id. at 100.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 96–97, 103–04.
178. Id. at 101.
179. See id. at 102 (“The Court assumes that unique facts in Sabine led to that court's

conclusions. To the extent that the pronouncements in Sabine were intended to be
generalized, this Court must reject them.”); see also id. at 103 (“An oil and gas lease is
distinguishable from a fee simple mineral estate. Although over-lapping in many respects, a
fee mineral estate contains a separate collection of rights. . . . Unlike in Sabine, where that
court focused its inquiry on a fee mineral estate, the relevant starting point here is Alta Mesa's
leasehold interest. . . . Sabine drew a distinction between covenants concerning the surface
estate and those that concern the mineral estate. That distinction is far from semantic. An oil
and gas lease contemplates extraction of hydrocarbons for profit. All of the property interests
associated with an oil and gas lease are necessary for the lessee to successfully explore and

162

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

1. Diverging from Sabine: Privity of Estate
The court in Alta Mesa recognized that in Oklahoma, as in Texas,
“privity requires that a covenant be made in conjunction with a
conveyance of property.”180 Instead of applying Sabine's privity analysis,
however, the court in Alta Mesa rejected it. In Sabine, the court refused
to find privity even though Sabine conveyed surface rights and easements
to HPIP and Nordheim at the time it pledged its produced and saved
minerals.181 The court reasoned that because the surface and mineral
estates are separate under Texas law, the conveyance of surface rights
was inadequately tied to Sabine's mineral interests.182
In Alta Mesa, the court reached the opposite result. As detailed
by Judge Isgur, a surface interest arising out of a mineral lease is integral
to the mineral interests arising out of the lease:
[T]he easements conveyed to Kingfisher a possessory
interest in the leasehold estate. The surface easement is
integrally tied to the purpose of an oil and gas lease. The
conveyance of the easements to Kingfisher is enough to
show horizontal privity . . . . Alta Mesa's surface
easements spring directly from its leasehold mineral
interest.
Because a surface easement is crucial
component of an oil and gas lease, the Court does not
view the conveyance as creating privity only with respect
to the surface estate.183
In short, because surface and mineral estates under a mineral lease are so
interconnected, the conveyance of a surface interest was sufficient to
satisfy the privity element with regard to the mineral interest. 184 In so
ruling, Judge Isgur reframed the “produced and saved” issue of Sabine;
dedicating only produced minerals could still create a covenant running

produce his reserves. Those lease-hold interests, targeted at the production of hydrocarbons,
are the real property interests which the Alta Mesa gathering agreements involve.”).
180. Id. at 101.
181. In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
182. Id.
183. Alta Mesa, 613 B.R. at 106.
184. See id.
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with the land when there was a concurrent conveyance of a real property
interest in the surface estate tied to the produce minerals.
2. Diverging from Sabine: Touch and Concern
In addition to finding privity, the Alta Mesa court also held that
the gathering agreements touched and concerned Alta Mesa's mineral
interests.185 For a covenant to touch and concern real property, there must
be “a logical connection between the benefit to be derived from
enforcement of the covenant and the property.”186 According to Judge
Isgur, “a covenant touches and concerns the land when it requires
performance of a physical act upon the land which directly benefits the
landowner …. If the value of the owner's interest in the land itself is
affected by the covenant, either positively or negatively, the covenant
touches and concerns the land.”187
Applying that analysis, the court noted that on the one hand,
Kingfisher used the surface easement Alta Mesa conveyed in order to
build a gathering system that enhanced the value of Alta Mesa's leases by
facilitating delivery of its minerals to market.188 On the other hand, the
court recognized that the gathering agreements imposed “costs and
delivery restrictions on produced hydrocarbons, which diminish the value
of Alta Mesa's unproduced reserves.”189 Moreover, the agreements
materially affected Alta Mesa's rights to its minerals. While it could
choose when and if to drill, it had no choice but to deliver its produced
minerals to Kingfisher.190
As in its “privity” analysis, the Alta Mesa court also focused on
the interconnectedness of surface and mineral rights under a mineral
lease.191 According to the court, a mineral lease consists of surface and
mineral interests, and “[a]ll of the property interests associated with an
oil and gas lease are necessary for the lessee to successfully explore and
produce his reserves. Those leasehold interests, targeted at the
production of hydrocarbons, are the real property interests which the Alta
185. Id. at 102.
186. Id.
187. Id. (internal citations omitted).
188. Id. at 103–04.
189. Id. at 102.
190. Id. at 104.
191. Id. at 103.
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Mesa gathering agreements involve.”192 Accordingly, a conveyance from
Alta Mesa to Kingfisher of surface rights for the construction of a
gathering system inherently burdened and related to Alta Mesa's mineral
interests under affected mineral leases. After all, the court reasoned,
“[w]ithout the surface easement, [a] [mineral] lessee cannot capture
reserve hydrocarbons.”193 Development of the surface for a gathering
system therefore inherently touched and concerned Alta Mesa's mineral
interests under related mineral leases, satisfying the second element of
the “runs with the land” test.194
3. Intent to Bind Successors
None of the substantive cases addressing whether a debtor can
reject a gathering agreement in bankruptcy turn on the issue of whether
parties to a gathering agreement intend to bind successors. In almost
every case, the issue of intent is either agreed or determined by the
express terms of the agreement.195 As a result, this article focuses on
whether the gathering agreements addressed in each key decision touch
and concern the land and whether privity exists between the parties to the
gathering agreements
4. Diverging from Sabine: Liberal Creation of Covenants Running with
the Land
The Alta Mesa court's “privity” and “touch and concern” analyses
presented a major departure from Sabine. As illustrated in the Wamsutter
dedications provided above and by Kingfisher's effort to establish a
conveyance of an interest in Alta Mesa's minerals in the gathering
agreement amendments, midstream gatherers focused on curing the
“produced and saved” language in the aftermath of Sabine.196 The court
in Alta Mesa, however, rendered that largely unnecessary.

192. Id.
193. Id. at 104.
194. Id.
195. See In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854, 870–71 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019); Alta

Mesa, 613 B.R. at 106–07; In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 282 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Jan. 16, 2020); In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC 623 B.R. 81 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2020);
In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 620 n.32 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
196. See supra notes 157–60, 166–71, and the text associated therewith.
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By focusing on the nature of mineral leases and the connection
between surface and mineral estates under a mineral lease, the court in
Alta Mesa promoted an exceptionally liberal analysis of the “privity” and
“touch and concern” elements of the “runs with the land” test. Applying
Alta Mesa, a gathering agreement will be a covenant running with the
land so long as: (1) the upstream party conveys an interest in the surface
estate of pertinent mineral leases to the midstream party; (2) the upstream
party dedicates the minerals from the mineral estates of those pertinent
mineral leases to the midstream party; (3) the midstream party agrees to
develop a gathering system on the conveyed surface interests; and (4) the
parties intend the covenant to be binding on successors-in-interest. It is
abundantly clear from Judge Isgur's ruling that if he applied his reasoning
to Sabine, the HPIP and Nordheim gathering agreements would be
covenants running with the land.197
The liberal creation of covenants running with the land set forth
in Alta Mesa creates potential underwriting issues for energy lenders. A
reserve-based lender, for instance, may have loaned money to an
upstream company based on its mineral reserves. 198 As a practical matter,
most reserve-based loans prohibit upstream borrowers from granting
non-lender parties liens or other encumbrances on the lender's
collateral—the borrower's mineral interests.199 In Sabine, for example,
the bankruptcy court noted that Sabine's Second Amended and Restated
Credit Agreement precluded Sabine from granting Nordheim and HPIP
liens on Sabine's mineral interests.200 An upstream borrower's entry into
a gathering agreement that conveyed a midstream counterparty a lien or
other encumbrance on the borrower's minerals would almost certainly
breach any applicable credit agreement and trigger a default. 201
Moreover, because a covenant running with the land cannot be
rejected in bankruptcy, an upstream debtor saddled with a seriously
disadvantageous gathering agreement is less likely to successfully

197. See generally In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 66–68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2016).
198. See, e.g., Southland, 623 B.R. at 97 n.134.
199. See supra note 49, Adv. D.I. 238-1, Lenders' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law at ¶ 8–

13.
200. Sabine, 550 B.R. at 67–68 n.41.
201. See, e.g., id. (noting that under the applicable credit agreement, if Sabine had

conveyed a real property interest in its minerals to Nordheim and HPIP, it would have
triggered an Event of Default under Sabine’s credit agreement).

166

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

reorganize. If the upstream debtor cannot reject a financially adverse
gathering agreement, and its midstream counterparty refuses to
restructure the terms of the agreement, the debtor may be forced to simply
liquidate its assets. Liquidation in a depressed oil and gas market may
result in huge write downs for the lenders to an upstream borrower who
has become undersecured due to market conditions.202
Liquidation, however, may not even be a viable means of
shedding a disadvantageous gathering agreement. As another leading
2019 energy lending case revealed, in some instances, even a sale free
and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances under section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code might not extinguish a covenant running with the
land.203
C.

In re Badlands: Covenant Running With Land204

Badlands Energy, Inc. and its debtor subsidiaries (collectively,
“Badlands”)205 filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on August 11,
2017, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado.206 The Badlands opinion arose from an adversary proceeding
filed by Monarch Midstream, LLC, f/k/a Monarch Natural Gas, LLC,
(“Monarch”) concerning Badlands' ability to (1) reject its gas gathering
agreement (the “GPA”) and saltwater disposal agreement (the “SWDA”)
with Monarch and (2) sell certain oil and gas assets free and clear of those
agreements.207
Prior to bankruptcy, Badlands was a consolidated natural gas and
petroleum exploration and production company that operated oil and gas
202. See, e.g. Becky Yerak, Texas-Based Driller Arena Energy Files for Bankruptcy: The
Gulf of Mexico Operator, Looking to Restructure More Than $1 Billion in Debt, Has a $64
Million Deal to Sell Virtually All of Its Assets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-based-driller-arena-energy-files-for-bankruptcy11598036183 [https://perma.cc/G6BY-PHXU]; 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2018) (bifurcating claims
of undersecured creditor into secured claim up to value of collateral, and undersecured claim
for any remaining amount due and owing).
203. See In re Badlands Energy, Inc., 608 B.R. 854 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019).
204. Unless otherwise noted herein, the definitions and meanings of terms provided in this
section IV.B. shall not apply to other sections of this article.
205. The Badlands debtors included Badlands Energy, Inc., f/k/a Gasco Energy, Inc.;
Badlands Production Company, f/k/a Gasco Production Company; Badlands Energy-Utah,
LLC; and Myton Oilfield Rentals, LLC.
206. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 862.
207. Id. at 860.
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leasehold interests in Utah's Uinta Basin.208 In 2010, Badlands sold
certain gas gathering and saltwater disposal facilities to Monarch,
pursuant to an asset purchase agreement (the “Facilities APA”).209 The
GPA and SWDA were executed contemporaneously with the Facilities
APA—and amended from time to time thereafter—to establish terms of
Badlands' continued use of the gathering and disposal facilities following
the asset sale to Monarch. 210 Monarch's obligation to close on the sale
was conditioned on Badlands' execution of the GPA and SWDA.211
In the GPA, Badlands dedicated its interests in certain gas
reserves to Monarch and agreed that all gas produced from those reserves
would be delivered exclusively through Monarch's gathering facilities. 212
The GPA dedication further stated that “[t]he dedication and commitment
under this Agreement is a covenant running with the land.”213 The GPA
also (1) contained a minimum volume commitment requiring Badlands
to pay a fee to Monarch if a minimum volume of gas was not delivered
to the gathering system each calendar quarter; (2) granted Monarch a
right-of-way and easement across the GPA Leases and adjoining lands
for the purpose of installing and maintaining the gathering systems; (3)
granted Monarch an irrevocable option to purchase a certain 50 acres of
land; (4) included an anti-assignability provision; and (5) stated that the
GPA bound and injured to the benefit of each party's successors and
assigns.214
Under the SWDA, Badlands committed to dispose all water
produced from certain production areas through Monarch's saltwater
disposal system and to pay fees to Monarch for the disposal and treatment

208. Id.
209. Id. at 861.
210. Id. at 864–66.
211. Id. at 866.
212. Id. at 864. The GPA dedication was of the “Dedicated Reserves,” which the GPA

defined as “the interest of Producer in all Gas reserves in and under, and all Gas owned by
Producer and produced or delivered from (i) the Leases and (ii) other lands within the AMI,
whether now owned or hereafter acquired, along with the processing rights, subject to certain
volume exclusions as described herein, and any and all additional right, title, interest, or claim
of every kind and character of Producer or its Affiliates in (x) the Leases or (y) lands within
the AMI, and Gas production therefrom, and all interests in any wells, whether now existing
or drilled hereafter, on, or completed on, lands covered by a Lease or within the AMI . . . .”
GPA, § 1.1, p. 2; see also Badlands, 608 B.R. at 864–65.
213. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 864–65.
214. Id. at 865–66.
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of its produced water.215 Like the GPA, the SWDA stated that “[t]he
commitment made by [Badlands] hereunder is a covenant running with
the land.”216
Three days into the bankruptcy case, Badlands filed a motion to
sell certain oil and gas assets (the “Riverbend Assets”) to Wapiti Utah,
LLC (“Wapiti Utah”) free and clear of the GPA and SWDA pursuant to
section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. 217 Exhibit A to the Wapiti Utah
Purchase and Sale Agreement expressly provided that “Wapiti Utah shall
not assume any contracts with Monarch in connection with the purchase
of the Riverbend Assets, including the GPA and SWDA.”218 In
conjunction with the sale, Badlands sought to reject both the GPA and
SWDA under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.219
On October 23, 2017, two days before the sale hearing, Monarch
filed its adversary complaint asserting that the GPA and SWDA were
covenants running with the land and that, as a result, the Riverbend Assets
could not be sold free and clear of those agreements. 220 Oddly, Monarch
also sought to have Wapiti Utah cure all prepetition monetary defaults
under the Agreements, totaling $1.2 million, pursuant to section 365 of
the Bankruptcy Code.221 Given the timing of Monarch's adversary
proceeding, the court approved the Sale Motion and Wapiti Utah's
Purchase and Sale Agreement subject to a later ruling as to whether the
GPA and SWDA were covenants running with the land. 222
Wapiti Utah moved for a judgment on the pleadings in the
adversary proceeding. 223 In doing so, Wapiti Utah argued that: (1) the
GPA and SWDA were rejected executory contracts; (2) neither the GPA
215. Id. at 866.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 862–63.
218. Id. at 863.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. The authors find Monarch’s cure demand very odd given the circumstances.

Monarch would not be entitled to any cure payment under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
unless the GPA and SWDA were executory contracts and assumed by Badlands and assigned
to Wapiti Utah. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2018). If they were executory contracts, however,
Badlands could simply reject the GPA and SWDA as intended. Simply put, the authors are
unaware of any scenario under the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to which a claimant could
receive a cure payment under section 365 for something other than an executory contract
otherwise subject to rejection.
222. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 863.
223. Id.
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nor SWDA satisfied the elements necessary to be covenants running with
the land; and (3) even if the agreements were covenants running with the
land, they were stripped from the Riverbend Assets as a result of
Badlands' “free and clear” sale under section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code.224
In response, Monarch filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking a determination that the GPA and SWDA were covenants
running with the land and that such covenants were not “interests” that
could be stripped from the Riverbend Assets through a sale under section
363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.225
Although the GPA and SWDA were both governed by Colorado
law, the court in Badlands applied Utah law because “property interests
are created and defined by state law, and the Riverbend assets are located
in Utah.”226 Utah law applies substantially the same test as Texas and
Oklahoma to determine whether a covenant runs with the land.
Covenants running with the land must (1) “touch and concern” the land;
(2) the parties must have intended that the covenant run with the land;
and (3) and there must be privity of estate between the parties. 227
1. Badlands: Touch and Concern
Utah's “touch and concern” test is similar to the Texas test applied
in Sabine and the Oklahoma test applied in Alta Mesa. The court provides
the following summary of the touch and concern inquiry under Utah Law:
In Flying Diamond, the Utah Supreme Court recognized
a broad test for touch-and-concern that does not require a
physical effect upon the land but rather, requires a court
to evaluate whether a covenant “enhances the land's value
[on the benefit side], and for the burden side, whether it
diminishes the land's value.” … “[A]ll that must be shown
224. Id. at 863–64; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (debtor “may sell property . . . free and clear
of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate . . .” if any provision of (f)(15) is satisfied) (emphasis added).
225. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 864.
226. Id. at 867.
227. Id. (citing Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 623 (Utah
1989)). Under Utah law, because a covenant running with the land concerns real property, it
must also be in writing and satisfy the statute of frauds. Id.
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for a covenant to run with the land is that it 'be of such
character that its performance or nonperformance will so
affect the use, value or enjoyment of the land itself that it
must be regarded as an integral part of the property.'“228
Put another way, “to touch and concern the land, a covenant must bear
upon the use and enjoyment of the land and be of the kind that the owner
of an estate or interest in land may make because of his ownership
right.”229 The Utah “touch and concern” test is objective and should be
conducted “without reference to the subjective mindset of original
covenantors.”230
Here, as in Alta Mesa, the court took a generally holistic analysis
of whether the GPA and SWDA touched and concerned the land:
Here, [Badlands'] interests in the Leases are diminished
by the [gathering agreements]. The burdens imposed
under the [gathering agreements] directly affect
[Badlands'] use and enjoyment of its interests in the
Leases in the [dedicated area]…the purpose of the
[gathering agreements] is to compensate Monarch for the
burdens associated with acquiring and operating the
Gathering System, which is connected to [Badlands']
Wells located on the Leases via the Receipt Points.231
The character of the covenant was therefore such “that its performance or
nonperformance will so affect the use value or enjoyment of the land
itself that it must be regarded as an integral party of the property.”232 It
did not matter to the court that one of the objectives of the gathering
agreements was to process and dispose of “produced gas.” Instead, the
court noted that, as a whole, the covenants affected the use and value of
the mineral estates by connecting Badlands’ minerals to gathering
systems that would enable them to be gathered and processed. 233
228. Id. at 868 (citing Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 624).
229. Id. at 867.
230. Id. at 867 (citing Stern v. Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy, 274 P.3d 935, 946

(Utah 2012)).
231. Id. at 868.
232. Id. at 870.
233. Id. at 869.
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Moreover, while the court disagreed with the Sabine ruling, it also
factually distinguished Sabine in that Badlands’ dedications included real
property interests in minerals “in and under” the surface estate. 234 As a
result, the court held that the covenants touched and concerned the land.
2. Badlands: Privity of Estate
The Badlands decision is unique in part because it analyzes three
potential types of privity under Utah law: vertical; mutual; and
horizontal.235 According to the court, vertical privity exists between an
original party and its successor.236 Wapiti Utah did not dispute its vertical
privity with Badlands; it purchased Badlands' assets. 237
The court then held that mutual privity exists among parties with
a continuing or simultaneous interest in the same property.238 In
Badlands, the court established mutual privity for two key reasons. First,
the gathering agreements dedicated in ground minerals, not just produced
minerals, to Monarch.239 While the dedication did not give Monarch a
“fee estate” to the dedicated reserves, the court determined it was
sufficiently based on an interest Monarch had in real property. 240 Second,
Monarch owned gathering and saltwater disposal systems and easements
on the same lands burdened by Badlands/Wapiti Utah's mineral leases
and dedicated reserves.241 Together, the substance of the parties'
overlapping interests was sufficient to establish mutual privity.242
The court next stated that horizontal privity exists under Utah law
when original covenanting parties create a covenant in connection with a
simultaneous conveyance of an estate. 243 The facts in Badlands relating
to horizontal privity are relatively unique because, in 2010, Badlands and
Monarch entered into the Facilities APA pursuant to which Badlands
conveyed a gathering system to Monarch concurrently with the parties'

234. Id.
235. Id. at 871 (citing Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 628).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 873.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 871.
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execution of the GPA and SWDA, which contained the dedications in
question.244 Citing the parties' 2010 conveyance and dedications, the
Badlands court found horizontal privity between Badlands and
Monarch. 245
Citing Sabine, Wapiti Utah argued that Monarch could not
establish horizontal privity because (1) the GPA and SWDA did not
actually convey real property interests, but merely pledged to deliver
extracted minerals, (2) Monarch's surface easements did not burden
Badlands' mineral interests.246 Rejecting Wapiti Utah's argument, the
court reiterated that unlike Sabine, the dedications in question included
in-ground minerals, not produced and saved minerals.247 While the court
noted that the dedications therefore burdened the mineral estate, it did not
go so far as to say that the dedication constituted a conveyance of an
interest in the in-ground minerals.248 Even so, taken in conjunction with
Badlands' conveyance of the gathering system and surface easements, the
net effect was sufficient to establish horizontal privity.249
3. Badlands: Intent
As in Sabine and Alta Mesa, the court spent little time analyzing
the intent of the parties to create a covenant running with the land. Both
the GPA and SWDA explicitly stated that the “Dedication” and
“Commitment” in those agreements were covenants running with the
land.250 Wapiti Utah argued, however, that Monarch's failure to record
the GPA's memorandum demonstrated a genuine dispute over the intent
of the parties to create a covenant running with the land binding on
successors. 251 The court again rejected Wapiti Utah's argument, however,
holding that “the failure to record implicates notice, not intent.”252 The
court then ruled “[i]n light of the intent clearly expressed in the

244. Id. at 861–62.
245. Id. at 873.
246. Id. at 874.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 870.
251. Id. at 870–71.
252. Id.
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Agreements themselves, the Court concludes Monarch and [Badlands]
intended the Agreements to run with the land….”253
4. Badlands: No Free and Clear Sale? An Underwriting Nightmare
Having determined that the Agreements constituted real property
covenants, one issue of relevance to this article remained before the court:
whether a sale of assets subject to a covenant running with the land under
section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code would be “free and clear” of the
covenant. 254 Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor in
possession “can only sell property of an estate free and clear of any
interest under one” of five circumstances,255 two of which were at issue
in Badlands: (i) “applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such
property free and clear of such interest; … or [(ii)] such entity could be
compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
satisfaction of such interest.”256
The court in Badlands ruled that Wapiti Utah could not satisfy
any element for a sale free and clear of Monarch's covenant running with
the land for one simple reason: under Utah law, a covenant running with
the land is not an “interest” that can be extinguished under section 363(f)
of the Bankruptcy Code.257 In Utah, the court explained, a covenant
253. Id. at 870.
254. The issue of whether Wapiti Utah was obligated to cure Badlands’ prepetition defaults

under section 365(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a remedy owed only to parties to an executory
contract, was resolved as expected. See supra note 221. The court noted that if the covenants
ran with the land, Monarch would not be party to any executory contract and so would be
ineligible as a matter of law to receive cure payments under section 365(b). As a result,
Monarch would simply have a pre-petition unsecured claim against Badlands for the default
and no recourse against Wapiti Utah. Id. at 875–76.
255. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018).
256. Badlands, 608 B.R. at 874 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)–(5)).
257. Stating:
Under Utah law, the nature of a covenant that runs with the land is such
“that it must be regarded as an integral part of the property.” Lundeberg
v. Dastrup, 28 Utah 2d 28, 497 P.2d 648, 650 (1972). Therefore, the
Agreements are part of the bundle of sticks Wapiti Utah acquired when it
purchased the Riverbend Assets, and they are not subject to elimination
utilizing Section 363(f). Similarly, this Court has previously held
restrictions that run with the land are not “interests” to which Section 363
applies: Restrictions that run with the land “create equitable interests that
do not compel a person to accept a monetary interest; thus, when
restrictive covenants are involved, there is nothing that can force those
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running with the land is something that, by its very nature “must be
regarded as an integral part of the property.”258 As a result, Monarch's
covenants running with the land were inherently “part of the bundle of
sticks Wapiti Utah acquired when it purchased the Riverbend Assets, and
they are not subject to elimination under Section 363(f).”259
In any event, even if section 363(f) did apply to Monarch's
covenants, the court reasoned, neither sections 363(f)(1) nor (f)(5) would
apply.260 Quoting its own prior opinion, the Badlands court held that
“restrictions that run with the land create equitable interests that do not
compel a person to accept a monetary interest; thus, when restrictive
covenants are involved, there is nothing that can force those who benefit
from restrictive covenants to forego equitable relief in favor of a cash
award.”261 Finally, quoting Sabine, the court issued a broad statement
that “it is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant that 'runs with the
land' [under section 365], since such a covenant creates a property interest
that is not extinguished in bankruptcy.”262
who benefit from restrictive covenants to ‘forego [sic] equitable relief in
favor of a cash award.’” In re Lonesome Pine Holdings, LLC, Case No.
10-34560 HRT (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 9, 2011), citing Skyline Woods
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Broekemeier, 276 Neb. 792, 758 N.W.2d 376,
393 (2008) (property sold in bankruptcy subject to implied restrictive
covenant running with the land requiring property only be used as a golf
course) (further citations omitted); see also Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d
295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Banning Lewis Ranch Co., LLC), 532 B.R.
335, 345–46 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015); In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd., 161
B.R. 338 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 196 B.R. 251 (E.D.N.Y.
1996); In re 523 E. Fifth St. Housing Pres. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id. at 874–75.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 875 (“Even if the real covenants at issue were subject to Section 363(f), neither
Section 363(f)(1) nor (f)(5) serve to strip the Riverbend Assets of the Agreements. Under
applicable nonbankruptcy law, covenants that run with the land in Utah 'bind successive
owners of the burdened or benefited land.' Stern v. Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy,
274 P.3d 935, 945 (Utah 2012) (citing Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 623). In other words,
Section 363(f)(1) cannot be satisfied because Utah law does not permit sale of property free
and clear of the covenants that run with it. Under Section 363(f)(5), Monarch could not be
'compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest'
because the interests of Monarch are part of the Riverbend Assets themselves.”).
261. Id. at 874 (quoting In re Lonesome Pine Holdings, LLC, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5775,
*1).
262. Id. at 875 (quoting In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 567 B.R. 869, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 2017),
aff'd, 734 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2018)).
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As a result of the court's ruling, Wapiti Utah purchased the
Riverbend Assets subject to the preexisting terms and conditions of the
GPA and SWDA. The ruling's effects, however, are far broader.
5. A Liberal Application of the “Runs with the Land” Test Creates
Uncertainty and Underwriting Nightmares
The Badlands and Alta Mesa courts' ruling broadly expanded the
Sabine court's application of the “runs with the land” test. Courts
following Badlands and Alta Mesa can go so far as to disregard whether
dedications in gathering agreements address minerals in the ground or
extracted minerals so long as there are other burdens on the upstream
party's interest in its mineral estate. As a result, a dedication of produced
minerals from the leases of certain mineral estates and a concurrent grant
of surface rights and easements on the surface estates of the leases would,
under Alta Mesa, create a covenant running with the land. That covenant,
under Badlands would not be subject to elimination through a “free and
clear” sale under section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In the context of underwriting reserve-based loans to upstream
exploration and production companies, the Badlands decision is a
disaster. In a typical reserve-based lending scenario like the one
discussed above, an upstream exploration and production company
borrows money and, in exchange, grants the lender a first priority lien on
all of its mineral reserves, whether currently owned or acquired in the
future.263 Later encumbrances are generally junior to the lender's
interest.264 As a result, a lender must be made whole before any junior
lienholder is paid anything. If the upstream borrower defaults, its lender
may typically foreclose and take possession of its collateral free and clear
of junior encumbrances.265 Similarly, in bankruptcy, a lender would

263. See, e.g., In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 97 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020)
(“With respect to section 363(f)(1), Wyoming law allows a preexisting mortgage with priority
over a later-created real property covenant to extinguish the covenant through foreclosure.
The purpose is to protect the mortgagee by ensuring that upon foreclosure, the mortgagee
acquires exactly such title as the mortgagor owned at the time the mortgage was executed.
Wamsutter does not dispute Wyoming state law on this matter or the priority of the RBL
Lenders' credit facilities or their foreclosure rights.”).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Burning Rock Energy LLC v. Pinnacle Gas Resources, Inc., 2007 WL
9706009, at *4 (D. Wyo. Mar. 6, 2007) (applying Wyoming law).
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typically have the right to credit bid its lien and purchase its collateral in
bankruptcy free and clear of all objecting junior lienholders under section
363(f)(1) or (f)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.266
After Badlands, however, lenders have little certainty of their
ability to foreclose out and extinguish later-in-time encumbrances arising
from gathering agreements. That creates a real underwriting concern.
When debtors seek to avoid gathering agreements in bankruptcy, it is
typically because the terms are economically disadvantageous. In Alta
Mesa, for example, the gathering agreements saddled the debtor with
excessive fees. 267 If unavoidable, those fees may make the production of
minerals infeasible. Put simply, despite owning vast reserves, the terms
of a gathering agreement may be so penal as to ensure that production
results in net losses to the upstream counterparty. An unavoidable
adverse gathering agreement may therefore so detrimentally burden an
upstream party's mineral interests as to render them worthless. That, of
course, jeopardizes a senior secured reserve-based lender's ability to
recover in the event of a default by the upstream borrower. 268
In application, Badlands weakens an earlier-in-time secured
lender's ability to recover against its collateral, because any foreclosure
or similar sale process must remain subject to the economically
disadvantageous gathering agreement. If operating under such an
agreement would result in a loss, the only party who may benefit from
266. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2018); In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 872 F.3d 892,
900 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying 363(f)(1) where state foreclosure law allows elimination of
junior encumbrances); In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 97–98 (Bankr. D. Del.
2020)
(citing Pinnacle for applicability of 363(f)(1) where state foreclosure law would allow
elimination of junior encumbrance, noting 363(f)(5) is applicable where state law allows
satisfaction of a claim through a money judgment, and citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90, 98, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) in support of interpretation of
bankruptcy code); see, e.g., In re Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Ala., 285 B.R. 497, 508 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2002) (interpreting section 363(f)(5) to authorize sales of property free and clear of
liens if trustee can point to other legal mechanisms that would extinguish liens). But see Dishi
& Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (minority view holding that
§ 363(f)(1) is only eligible if the property owner could bring an appropriate action under
nonbankruptcy law) (citing In re Jaussi, 488 B.R. 456, 458 (Bankr. D.Colo.2013)).
267. In re Alta Mesa Res., Inc., 613 B.R. 90, 95 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2019).
268. See Jesse S. Lotay & Yenmi Tang, Address at 46th Annual Ernest E. Smith Oil, Gas
and Mineral Law Fundamentals and Institute: A Primer on Understanding Oil and Gas
Transportation Agreements and Identifying Key Issues 1 (Mar. 26–27, 2020),
https://www.jw.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Jesse-Lotay-Yenmi-Tang-UT-CLE-APrimer-on-Understanding-Oil-and-Gas-Transportation-Agreements-Mar.-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7SL5-AUX7].
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the underlying reserves is the later-in-time gatherer, not the earlier-intime lender whose collateral must flow through the gatherer. As
discussed in detail below, this hypothetical is not idle speculation, but a
harsh reality.
V. THE BACKLASH: REVISITING SABINE AND A CLOSER ANALYSES OF
COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND
Many economic and practical factors precipitated a wave of oil
and gas bankruptcy filings in 2020. Three of those bankruptcy cases
involved struggling upstream companies that were parties to
economically disadvantageous gathering agreements.269 As discussed
below, two of the three cases rejected Alta Mesa and Badlands,
determined that the gathering agreements were executory contracts, and
enabled the bankrupt debtors to reject the gathering agreements under
section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.270 While that may be cause for
celebration to upstream companies and their lenders, the uncertainty
arising from Badlands remains, and one court's ruling rejecting a
gathering agreement suggests Alta Mesa remains alive and well.
A.

In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc.: Turning the Tide

Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc. (and with its affiliates, “Extraction”)
is an upstream exploration and production company that produces oil and
related hydrocarbons from wells located in Colorado. 271 In 2017,
Extraction entered into a series of transportation agreements
(“Transportation Agreements”) with various midstream counterparties
(the “Gatherers”).272
The Transportation Agreements generally contained expansive
dedications that included “all interests that [Extraction] . . . now or
269. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re
Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274, 276 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020); In re Extraction Oil
& Gas, 622 B.R. 608, 614 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
270. See infra sections V.A., V.B., and V.C.
271. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 581, 584–86 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020)
(providing detailed factual background regarding the debtor’s operations and gathering
agreements, along with detailed legal analysis of covenant running with the land test); see
also In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 608 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) (providing
additional legal analysis on potential rejection of covenants even if they do run with the land).
272. Extraction, 622 B.R. at 585–86.
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hereafter owns, controls, acquires or has the right to market in Crude
Petroleum of all formations in, under or attributable to the Dedication
Area, and all interests in any wells, whether now existing or drilled
hereafter . . . .”273 Certain of the Transportation Agreements made clear
that the parties intended the dedications to run with the land. For
example, one Transportation Agreement expressly stated that “the
dedication and commitment . . . shall be deemed an interest that runs with
the land in the dedication Area . . . [Extraction] agrees to execute and
deliver a memorandum . . . for each of [the applicable countries] to
[Gatherer] for recording in the real property records of each such country
. . . .”274 The Transportation Agreements also contained express
provisions stating that they would inure to the benefit of the parties'
successors-in-interest.275
The Transportation Agreements did note, however, that
Extraction retained title to all minerals delivered to Gatherers, and that
Extraction's minerals were free and clear of all liens, claims, and
encumbrances other than Extraction's lender's liens.276
Further,
Extraction did not grant any easement or rights-of-way to the Gatherers
contemporaneously with the Transportation Agreements.277
On August 14, 2020, Extraction filed for bankruptcy relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.278 Less than two months later,
Extraction moved to reject the Transportation Agreements as executory
contracts under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and, shortly
thereafter, filed an adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment
ruling that the Transportation Agreements were, in fact, executory
contracts subject to rejection.279
As the assets purportedly subject to the Gatherers’ covenant were
located in Colorado, the Extraction court applied Colorado law. 280 The
court noted that Colorado law “disfavors the creation of covenants
running with the land as a derogation of the common law's preference for
273. Id. at 587–88.
274. Id. at 588 (citing to Adv. D.I. 5-2 (filed under seal), Notice of Filing of Exhibits to

Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B at § 2.5).
275. Id. at 593–94.
276. Id. at 590–91.
277. Id. at 586.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 595.
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free alienability of land.”281 As a result, the court determined that “any
ambiguity concerning whether the terms of the Transportation
Agreements created covenants running with the land would be resolved
in favor of the unrestricted use of the land.”282
To create a covenant running with the land under Colorado law,
a party must prove three elements: (1) the covenant must touch and
concern the land; (2) there must be privity of estate between the original
covenanting parties; and (3) the parties must intend to create a covenant
running with the land.283 In Extraction, the court ruled that the Gatherers
failed to prove any of the three requisite elements and that, as a result, the
Transportation Agreements could be rejected. 284
1. Extraction: Touch and Concern
For a covenant to touch and concern land under Colorado law, it
must be “closely related to the estate in real property with which it is
intended to run, its use, or enjoyment.”285 In this case, that “real property
with which” the covenants purportedly ran was “Extraction's mineral
estate.”286 The question was therefore whether the dedications and
commitments in the Transportation Agreements touched and concerned
Extraction's mineral interests.287
The Gatherers, citing Badlands, argued that the dedication of inground minerals in the Transportation Agreements necessarily touched
and concerned the land.288 The court disagreed. The court analyzed the
Transportation Agreements and noted that they were, in their
fundamental essence, a contract for the transportation of produced
minerals.289 Reference to minerals in the ground simply identified the
minerals that, once extracted, would flow through the Gatherers’
pipelines for a fee. 290 A dedication is, therefore, just a pledge that
281. Id. at 596 (citing Nelson v. Farr, 354 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. 1960)).
282. Id. at 595 (citing B.B. & C. P’ship v. Edelweiss Condo. Ass’n, 218 P.3d 310, 315

(Colo. 2009)).
283. Id. at 596.
284. Id. at 608.
285. Id. at 598 (internal parenthetical omitted).
286. Id.
287. See id. at 599–600.
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. Id.
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identifies the minerals that, once extracted, will be subjected to the
services identified in the Transportation Agreements. 291 As a result, a
dedication identifying pledged minerals does not inherently burden those
minerals.292
While the Transportation Agreements contractually obligated
Extraction to deliver to Gatherers its pledged minerals, once extracted,
the Transportation Agreements did not grant any right to the Gatherers to
affect Extraction's in-ground minerals. 293 As stressed by the court,
“Extraction retains exclusive control and possession of all minerals from
severance from the ground through delivery into the pipeline systems …
Extraction retains title to the crude petroleum throughout the entire
transportation process, and the [Gatherers] never obtain title to the crude
petroleum at any point.”294
Fundamentally, the Transportation
Agreements did not affect Extraction's use or enjoyment of oil in place or
the use of the mineral estate. It only affected what Extraction could do
with its extracted minerals.295 As a result, the Transportation Agreements
did not touch and concern the land—in this case, Extraction’s mineral
estate.
2. Extraction: Privity of Estate
Under Colorado law, “[p]rivity of estate requires that the
covenants that allegedly run with the land be accompanied by a
contemporaneous conveyance of some interest in the land with which the
covenant runs.”296 A later-in-time conveyance cannot establish privity
for an earlier-in-time covenant. 297 The court continued, noting that once
a surface and mineral estate are severed, they remain separate and distinct
estates in real property.298 As a result, the conveyance of an interest in a

291. Id. at 600–01.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 601–02.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 605 (citing Taylor v. Melton, 274 P.2d 977, 988-89 (Colo. 1954)).
297. Id. at 606–07 (holding that a conveyance of rights-of-way two years after entry into

the Transportation Agreements could not satisfy privity of estate even if it affected
Extraction’s mineral estate, because it was not “contemporaneous with the creation of the
covenant intended to run.”) (emphasis in original).
298. Id. at 605 (citing Notch Mountain Corp. v. Elliot, 898 P.2d 550, 556 (Colo. 1995)).
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severed surface estate will not satisfy the privity test for a covenant
burdening the severed mineral estate. 299
None of the conveyances asserted by the Gatherers, which
included “purported easements or rights-of-way on Extraction's surface
estate” and “the Transportation Agreements' dedications,” satisfied
Colorado's privity of estate test because none of them involved a
conveyance of Extraction's mineral estate.300 The court reasoned that the
dedication granted personal rights for the use of the surface estate, but
that those rights were inherently severed from the mineral estate. 301 Just
because a gatherer is entitled to access or develop the surface does not
actually give it any interest in the mineral estate. Moreover, the
dedication of surface rights could not by itself be a covenant running with
the land. As the court reasoned, the surface estate dedications “cannot be
both the real covenant and the element that satisfies privity of estate to
create a real covenant.”302 Without some other contemporaneous
conveyance, the Gatherers could not satisfy the privity element of the
“runs with the land” test.303 The Extraction gathering agreement was not,
therefore, a covenant running with the land.
3. Extraction: A Return to Sabine?
The Extraction decision is important for several reasons. First, it
is one of the only widely publicized decisions304 addressing gathering
agreements that stresses a common law disfavor for the creation of
covenants running with the land. Second, it returns to Sabine’s focus on
the separation of the surface and mineral estate and treats each as largely
independent real property interests. Doing so raises the burden of proving

299. Id.
300. Id. at 607.
301. Id. at 607–08 (citing Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 945 (Colo. 2002)).
302. Id. at 608–09.
303. Id. at 605.
304. See, e.g., Allison Good, Extraction Oil & Gas can Reject Midstream Contracts,

Bankruptcy Court Says, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE, (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/extraction-oil-gas-can-reject-midstream-contracts-bankruptcy-court-says60747959 [https://perma.cc/4QAS-DRE9]; Greg Avery, Colorado Oil Company Wins
Pipeline Ruling from Bankruptcy Court, DENVER BUS. J. (Oct. 15, 2020, 8:33 AM)
https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2020/10/15/extraction-midstream-chapter-11bankruptcy-court.html [https://perma.cc/A4QJ-URAG].
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the existence of a covenant running with the land. Third, the court in
Extraction arguably disagreed with Badlands’ ruling that a covenant
running with the land is not an “interest” for the purposes of section 363
of the Bankruptcy Code. In dicta, the court in Extraction noted that a
“covenant running with the land, creates ‘an equitable property interest
in the burdened land’” and cited a quotation stating “covenants running
with the land, are not a lien or executory contract but rather, ‘an interest
in land . . . .’”305
B.

In re Chesapeake Energy Corporation: Houston, Do We Have a
Contradiction?

On June 28, 2020, energy giant Chesapeake Energy Corporation
and its affiliates (collectively “Chesapeake”) filed for bankruptcy relief
and immediately moved to reject a natural gas purchase agreement with
its pipeline counterparty (“ETC”).306 Chesapeake entered into the
agreements with ETC more than four years before Chesapeake's
bankruptcy filing.307 Under the ETC agreements, Chesapeake agreed to
sell and ETC agreed to purchase all of Chesapeake's gas from dedicated
leases, subject to certain allowed uses by Chesapeake, up to certain
agreed volume limits.308
As part of the agreements, Chesapeake dedicated “for sale and
delivery hereunder all of the Gas owned or controlled by [Chesapeake]
that is produced from the oil and gas leases described” in an exhibit to the
agreement.309 The dedication expressly stated that it was “a covenant
running with the land, and [ETC] and [Chesapeake] shall sign, and [ETC]
shall file in the property records of the applicable county or counties, a
Memorandum of this Transaction Confirmation . . . .”310 Despite the
purported covenant running with the land in Chesapeake's gas, ETC's
exclusive remedy for Chesapeake's breach under the agreements was a
right to money damages.311
305. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., 622 B.R. 581, 596 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) (emphasis

added).
306. In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274, 276–77 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).
307. Id. at 277.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 278.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 279.
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1. Chesapeake: The Texas Test
When analyzing whether the Chesapeake agreements were
covenants running with the land, the court applied a six element test
slightly different than that referenced in Sabine: (1) did the obligation
touch and concern the land; (2) did the obligation relate to a thing in
existence or bind the parties and their assigns; (3) did the parties intend
for the obligation to run with the land; (4) did the successor to the burden
have notice of the obligation; (5) was there privity of estate or vertical
privity between the parties at the time the covenant was created; and (6)
was there horizontal privity.312 However, the court noted, while listing
those elements, that in Energytec the Fifth Circuit questioned whether
horizontal privity remains an element of the “runs with the land test.”313
While the court appears to be skeptical of the necessity of its
inclusion, it recognized that, though questioned by the Fifth Circuit, the
court in Energytec did in fact perform a horizontal privity test as part of
its analysis.314 Moreover, while the court lists six potential elements for
inclusion in the Texas test, its analysis focused only on the three standard
elements addressed by each of the cases analyzed in this article: (1) did
the covenant touch and concern the land; (2) was there privity of estate;
and (3) did the parties intend to create a covenant running with the land.315
As a preliminary matter, the Chesapeake court noted that
executory contracts and covenants running with the land are not mutually
exclusive.316 Judge Jones reasoned that nothing in the text of section 365
of the Bankruptcy Code creates mutual exclusivity, and that it is possible
to contemplate an executory contract that also contains a covenant that
runs with the land.317 The court stated that, in such an event, the
312. Id. at 281 (citing In re El Paso Refiner, LP., 302 D.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 2002) (cited
for first four elements); In re Energytex, Inc., 739 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 2013) (cited for the
fifth element and sixth elements)).
313. Id. at 281. (citing Energytex, 739 F.3d at 221).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 282–283.
316. Id. at 281.
317. Id. (“ETC repeatedly asserts that the ETC Purchase Agreement cannot be an executory
contract if it contains a covenant that runs with the land. ETC does not cite nor is the Court
able to locate any authority for such a proposition. Likewise, § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
contains no such exclusion and no known rule or law prohibits the mutual existence of both
concepts within a single document. It does not stretch the imagination to envision a contract
that both contains a covenant that runs with the land and is executory. In such a circumstance,
the appropriate analysis is what benefit was previously bestowed by the debtor on the non-
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“appropriate analysis is what benefit was previously bestowed by the
debtor on the non-rejecting party that remains post-rejection and what
future performance by the debtor is excused by the rejection.”318 While
the court opened the door to a whole new issue—whether a party could
reject an executory contract that otherwise created a limited covenant
running with the land—it found no need to pursue the analysis in light of
the terms of the contract in question.319
2. Chesapeake: Touch and Concern
Under Texas law, a covenant “touches and concerns the land
when the underlying obligations affect the nature, quality or value of the
thing demised, independently of collateral circumstances, or it affect[s]
the mode of enjoying it.”320 In Chesapeake, ETC argued that the
agreement touched and concerned Chesapeake's mineral estate because
of Chesapeake's dedication of all of its gas321 produced from specifically
identified oil and gas leases. Further, ETC noted that the memorandum
recording Chesapeake's purported covenant dedicated all gas owned by
Chesapeake “and underlying or produced from the Dedicated Leases . .
.” to ETC.322 As a result, ETC argued, the covenant touched minerals
underlying specific leases.323 The court rejected ETC's argument by
applying an analysis similar to that applied in Sabine.
First, the court determined that the dedication applied only to
produced gas, which necessarily meant gas that had been removed from
the ground and was ready for collection at the debtor's wellheads. 324
Under Texas law, gas that has been extracted from the ground is personal

rejecting party that remains post-rejection and what future performance by the debtor is
excused by the rejection. Depending on the particular language of the subject agreement, a
plethora of outcomes are possible.”) (citation omitted).
318. Id. (citing Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1658
(2019) (addressing effects of rejection on licensee’s right to continue use of licensed
trademark after licensor’s rejection of parties’ executory contract)).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 283 (citing In re El Paso Refinery, LP, 302 F.3d 343, 356 (5th Cir. 2002));
Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. 1982); Wimberly v.
Lone Star Gas Co., 818 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991) (writ denied).
321. Up to certain volume limits referenced in the agreement known as the “SRC”.
322. Id. at 278 n.2.
323. See id.
324. Id.
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property.325 Accordingly, although the dedication referenced “Dedicated
Leases,” the substance actually dedicated to ETC was produced gas in
certain volumes.326 As the court reasoned, “[o]nly after gas is produced
and becomes personal property does an obligation regarding the
disposition of that gas arise.”327
Second, the court analyzed whether the purported covenant
running with the land actually affected Chesapeake's real property
interests.328 The court determined that under the agreement, ETC had “no
right of access to or control over Chesapeake's use of its real property
interest.”329 ETC had a right to receive produced gas under the agreement
and nothing more. Further, its only remedy was a claim for monetary
damages against Chesapeake. Without more, the court reasoned, the
agreement did not “touch and concern” Chesapeake's real property
mineral interests.330
3. Chesapeake: Privity
The court's analysis of whether privity existed diverged
considerably from that of Sabine. While the Chesapeake court
summarily found a lack of horizontal privity, it focused its privity
analysis almost exclusively on vertical privity under Texas law. 331
Vertical privity requires only a “mutual or successive relationship to the
same rights of property.”332 The question in Chesapeake was therefore
whether Chesapeake transferred any interest in its real property to ETC.
ETC asserted that the language of dedication evidenced such a
transfer. 333 ETC argued that under the ETC Agreement's express terms,
Chesapeake dedicated “such property rights arising out of the Dedicated
Leases necessary to burden the Dedicated Leases with [Chesapeake’s]
dedication of the Dedicated Leases and Gas,” and that this specific

325. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 1975)).
326. Id. at 283.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See id. at 282–83.
331. Id. at 284.
332. Id. at 283.
333. Id.
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reference to “property rights” satisfied vertical privity.334 Admittedly,
that language is difficult to follow. The court, however, translated it to
mean “we dedicate whatever is necessary to make sure that the dedication
is valid.”335 Chesapeake's agreement with ETC was, in essence, a
forward contract for the purchase of gas.336 While ETC had a contractual
right to purchase Chesapeake's produced gas from a dedicated area for a
certain fee, no dedication or conveyance of any real property interest was
necessary to effectuate any of the terms and conditions of the
agreement.337 Without that corollary, there was no vertical privity in
Chesapeake. 338 Having failed to prove any of the necessary elements to
establish a covenant running with the land, the court ruled against ETC
and determined that the contract was executory and subject to rejection.
4. A Disagreement in Houston? Perhaps not.
The Chesapeake decision is notable in part because it was
rendered by Judge Jones, who is bench mates with Judge Isgur at the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas,

334. Id. (emphasis added).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 283–84. Quoting section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code for the definition of a

“forward contract,” the court explains as follows:
Under § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code, a forward contract means: [A]
contract (other than a commodity contract, as defined in section 761) for
the purchase, sale, or transfer of a commodity, as defined in section
761(8) of this title, or any similar good, article, service, right, or interest
which is presently or in the future becomes the subject of dealing in the
forward contract trade, or product or byproduct thereof, with a maturity
date more than two days after the date the contract is entered into,
including, but not limited to, a repurchase or reverse repurchase
transaction (whether or not such repurchase or reverse repurchase
transaction is a “repurchase agreement”, as defined in this section) [2]
consignment, lease, swap, hedge transaction, deposit, loan, option,
allocated transaction, unallocated transaction, or any other similar
agreement . . . . The parties' agreement is indicative that the object of the
ETC Purchase Agreement is the ongoing purchase and sale of personal
property—not the burdening of a real property interest.
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(A)).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 284.
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Houston Division.339 Judge Isgur of course decided Alta Mesa. Further,
it involved a Texas judge applying Texas law and, like Sabine, finding
that a midstream oil and gas contract masquerading as a covenant running
with the land was a rejectable executory contract. On its face, it initially
appears that Judge Jones diverges from Judge Isgur's ruling in Alta Mesa.
A closer reading, however, suggests otherwise.
In his ruling, Judge Jones considers an argument from ETC in
which ETC states that Alta Mesa unequivocally stands for the proposition
that the inclusion of a covenant running with the land in a contract
precludes rejection.340
While Judge Jones perhaps surprisingly
challenged ETC's interpretation, he did affirmatively state that the
decision in Alta Mesa was “proper given the relief requested, the
arguments raised by the parties and addressed by the court . . . .”341
What is perhaps more surprising is that Judge Jones affirmatively
applied Judge Isgur's Alta Mesa analysis when issuing his conclusion and
ruling.342 Applying Judge Isgur's analysis appears unnecessary under the
circumstances. First, Alta Mesa involved Oklahoma law, not Texas law.
Judge Isgur's decision in Alta Mesa promoted a liberal application of the
“runs with the land” test under Oklahoma law as opposed to the
considerably more conservative approach in Sabine, which applied Texas
law. That conflict is noticeable in Chesapeake. Although Judge Jones
approved Judge Isgur's liberal Alta Mesa analysis, he also recognized that
Texas Supreme Court case law disfavors covenants running with the land,
339. Judge Jones and Judge Isgur handle the vast majority of complex chapter 11
bankruptcy cases filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Texas. Recently, their Houston courtrooms have become among the busiest commercial
bankruptcy courts in the nation, and among the most influential courts addressing oil and gas
bankruptcy issues in the United States. See December 2020 Bankruptcy Statistics –
Commercial Filings, AM. BANKR. INST., https://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics
[https://perma.cc/37UQ-EBCX] (reporting that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas received the second-most commercial bankruptcy filings in the
United States in 2020 and received nearly 60% more filings than it did in 2019 despite a
16.75% reduction in total commercial filings nationally. For comparison, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York saw almost no increase in filings in
2020).
340. In re Chesapeake Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274, 281 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).
341. Id. at 281–82.
342. Id. at 284 (“Applying Judge Isgur's analysis in Alta Mesa and the specific content of
the ETC Purchase Agreement, the Court concludes that . . . .”). The authors suspect that Judge
Jones included this statement, which was unnecessary considering Alta Mesa was determined
under a different state’s law, to ensure the Chesapeake decision is not later used to evidence
a shift in the court’s reasoning from Alta Mesa to something closer to Sabine.
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and that all ambiguities must be strictly construed against the party
seeking to enforce a covenant running with the land under Texas law. 343
Judge Jones’s does little to resolve that apparent contradiction.
Second, the distinguishing elements of the Alta Mesa decision are
absent in Chesapeake. Alta Mesa, like Sabine, included a dedication of
produced minerals—a personal property interest—along with certain
rights related to the surface estate. Contrary to Sabine, Judge Isgur
determined that despite dedicating only produced minerals, the
conveyance of interests in the surface estate resulted in a covenant that
ran with the underlying mineral estate because of the interconnected
nature of those estates in the context of a gathering agreement.
Chesapeake, however, did not even involve dedications of surface rights
or the development of any gathering system. Its analysis is, in relevant
part, rather inapplicable to the facts of Chesapeake. Regardless,
Chesapeake denied the existence of a covenant running with the land in
a contract that involved a dedication of produced gas; thus, it appears Alta
Mesa remains superior to Sabine in the Southern District of Texas. It is
not, however, the favored law of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Delaware.
C.

In re Southland Royalty Company: Another Covenant Bites the
Dust

Southland Royalty Company LLC (“Southland”) is an upstream
exploration and production company “focused on the acquisition,
development, and exploitation of oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquid
reserves in North America.”344 In 2016, Southland acquired its interests
in oil and gas wells covering more than 500,000 net working interest
acres in the Wamsutter Field of Wyoming through a transaction with
Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, Anadarko Land Corp., and Kerr-McGee
Oil and Gas Onshore, LP (collectively, “Anadarko”).345
In June, 2016, Southland entered into contracts with Wamsutter
LLC (“Wamsutter”), a large midstream pipeline company, for the
343. See id. at 281 (“Covenants restricting the unfettered use of one's real property are
generally disfavored under Texas law. Any ambiguity is strictly construed against the party
seeking to enforce the restriction.”) (citing Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.
1987)).
344. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. 64, 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
345. Id.
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treatment, processing, and transportation of minerals extracted from its
interests in the Wamsutter Field.346 Wamsutter's gathering system is
described by the court as “a large highway of pipes, compressors,
dehydrators, processing plants, and other facilities that enable Wamsutter
to gather, transport, process, and treat the gas produced from Southland's
wells so that it can be taken downstream for sale.”347 In total, the
Wamsutter gathering system consists of, “among other things, thousands
of miles of pipelines, numerous gas compressor stations, and a gas
processing plant.”348 Given the size and scope of the gathering system
and the Wamsutter Field, Wamsutter's facilities are critical to upstream
entities like Southland that want to take their produced minerals to
market.
At issue in Southland were two gathering agreements.349 The first
gathering agreement between Southland and Wamsutter, dated June 1,
2016 is known as the L60 Agreement.350 The L60 Agreement expires by
its terms on December 31, 2031.351 The second, dated November 1, 2018,
is known as the L63 Agreement (and together, the “Gas Gathering
Agreements”).352 The L63 Agreement expires by its terms on October 1,
2038.353
Most of Southland's wells under the L60 Agreement were
traditional vertical wells.354 Shortly after acquiring its interest from
Anadarko, Southland desired to effectuate a large horizontal drilling
program in an effort to dramatically increase production in the Wamsutter
Field.355 To handle the increased production, Southland contracted with
Wamsutter for the development of multiple additional compressor
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See supra notes 158–63 and accompanying text.
350. In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. at 71–72.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 73.
354. Id. at 72–73 (“Because the then-existing Wamsutter Gathering System was designed

to accommodate vertical wells, it was determined that modifications were needed to provide
incremental capacity to accommodate Southland's future horizontal wells. Horizontal wells
typically produce gas at a much higher volume than vertical wells. As a result, if not updated,
a gathering system servicing vertical wells may be incapable of handling the additional
volume from horizontal wells. The resulting increased pressure on the system could reduce or
completely stop production from the vertical wells.”) (emphasis added).
355. Id.
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stations, miles of additional pipeline, and other related equipment. 356
Wamsutter expected the project to cost approximately $350 million to
complete.357 In order to effectuate the expansion, the parties executed the
L63 Agreement.358
The “Shippers Dedication” found in the L63 Agreement states, in
pertinent part:
Shipper dedicates to the performance of this Agreement
the Dedicated Properties and Dedicated Gas and grants to
[Wamsutter] the exclusive right to Gather, Process,
Dehydrate and Treat the Produced Dedicated Gas
(“Dedication”). This Dedication shall be a covenant
running with the land under applicable law and binding
on the respective successors and assigns of the interests
of Shipper and its Affiliates in and to the Dedicated
Properties and Dedicated Gas. If applicable law requires
any amendment or modification to this Agreement for
this Dedication to be treated as an enforceable covenant
running with the land, the parties will promptly enter into
any such addendum or modification. Gatherer may file
memoranda of this Agreement substantially in the form
of Exhibit “J” in local land records from time to time in
its discretion, and Shipper will promptly enter into any
such memoranda upon request.359
By contrast, the L60 Agreement's “Shippers Dedication” states, “Shipper
dedicates Shipper's Gas within the Area of Interest described in Exhibit
B to [Wamsutter] for Gathering, Processing, Dehydrating and Treating.”
Following the execution of the L63 Agreement, the parties
worked together on the development of the corresponding gathering
infrastructure. In late 2019, however, Southland began to experience
severe economic hardship and demanded that Wamsutter cease all
additional capital expenditures related to the L63 infrastructure

356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 74–75.
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improvements.360 In its notice to Wamsutter, Southland admitted to
suffering from diminished drilling economics and limited access to
capital caused by the decline in commodity prices, underperforming
wells, and unanticipated operational issues.361
On January 27, 2020, Southland filed for bankruptcy relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.362 Instead of immediately
challenging whether the Gas Gathering Agreements were covenants
running with the land, Southland pursued a robust, well marketed sale
process for substantially all of its assets in the Wamsutter Field.363 As
part of the sale process, Southland worked to facilitate a renegotiation of
the L63 agreement between potential purchasers and Wamsutter, who
willingly participated in those discussions.364
Unfortunately, no potential purchaser was able to reach any
meaningful agreement with Wamsutter over the renegotiation of the L63
Agreement and its minimum volume commitments.365 As a result,
Southland's sale process failed and, on March 27, 2020, Southland
commenced an adversary proceeding against Wamsutter seeking a
declaratory judgment holding, in pertinent part, that the Gas Gathering
Agreements were subject to rejection as executory contracts.366 After a
lengthy trial, supplemental briefing, and extensive oral argument, the
court ruled that “for many of the same reasons set forth by the courts in
Sabine and Extraction, the L63 Agreement contains no real
covenants.”367 Instead, the court ruled, it was merely a services contract
for the gathering of Southland’s personal property.368 More surprisingly,
the court further ruled that even if the L63 Agreement did contain a “real
covenant,” it could be rejected under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.369

360. See id. at 75.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 71.
363. Id. at 76–77.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 79–80.
368. Id. at 80.
369. Id.
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Beginning its analysis, the court in Southland noted that
covenants running with the land are typically disfavored.370 As a general
rule, under Wyoming law, no one should be held liable for obligations
under a contract unless by his express consent by entry into the
agreement.371 As a result, covenants running with the land that
automatically burden successive owners should be considered an
exception to the general rule and should be disfavored.372
To create a covenant running with the land under Wyoming law,
four elements are required: (1) the original covenant must be enforceable;
(2) the parties must intend the covenant runs with the land; (3) the
covenant must touch and concern the land; and (4) there must be privity
of estate between the parties.373 Importantly, because covenants running
with the land are disfavored under Wyoming law, they must “be strictly
constructed, will not extend by implication, and in case of doubt the
restriction will be constructed in favor of the free use of the land.”374 This
article focuses on whether the purported covenant touched and concerned
the land and whether there was privity estate between the parties, as those
two elements are consistently determinative in each of the previous
bankruptcy decisions addressing whether a covenant runs with the land.
1. Southland: Touch and Concern
In Southland, the court determined that, under Wyoming law, the
question of whether a covenant touched and concerned the land depended
on whether it substantively affected Southland's “legal rights in its real
property.”375 The court ruled with beautiful simplicity that “the L63
Dedication does not alter Southland's legal rights in its real property.”376
In support of its ruling, the court reasoned that:

370. Id. at 80–82.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 80.
374. Id. at 82 n.65 (citing Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855, 859 (Wyo. 1984); Kindler

v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 268 (1967); Pennaco Energy Inc. v. KD Co., LLC, 363 P.3d 18, 37
(Wyo. 2015)).
375. Id. at 83.
376. Id.
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It is undisputed that Southland is free to do what it likes
with its unproduced gas reserves, including decreasing or
ceasing
further
exploration,
drilling,
and
production…Wamsutter has no right to enter the L63 Are
of Interest and access or control Southland's unproduced
reserves, including through its own development. It is
only once the gas in the L63 Area of Interest is produced
that the L63 Dedication takes affect by requiring the
production to be served by Wamsutter and the Wamsutter
Gathering System in exchange for the agreed upon fees.
At that point, Wamsutter takes title to and control of the
produced gas . . . .”377
Accordingly, only Southland's produced gas from the L63 Area of
Interest was affected by the Dedication, and produced gas is a personal
property interest under Wyoming law.378
Further, the court continued, any benefit to the value of
Southland's reserves caused by the Wamsutter gathering system was
indirect, or collateral, because they arose only from services associated
with Southland's produced gas.379 As the Dedication only directly affects
Southland's legal rights in its produced gas—personal property—it
cannot run with the land.
2. Southland: Privity of Estate
Under Wyoming law, privity of estate can only be created by a
conveyance of the real property that the parties seek to encumber. 380 The
court noted that the L63 Dedication was not a conveyance of a real
property interest but instead an exclusivity agreement tied to produced
gas—personal property.381 Because the debtor did not convey its mineral
estate, the mineral estate could not be burdened by a covenant running

377. Id. at 83–84.
378. Id. at 84.
379. Id. at 85.
380. Id. at 86 (“Privity of estate can only be created in the first instance in connection with

a grant of the land sought to be charged, or an estate therein, or the equivalent thereof.”) (citing
Lingle Water Users’ Ass’n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 297 P. 385, 391 (1931)).
381. Id.
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with the land.382 Applying a Sabine-like analysis, the court further ruled
that any floating easements conveyed in the L63 Agreement or executed
between the parties were not tied to Southland's mineral interests because
the surface and mineral estates are severed. 383 Accordingly, even a
conveyance of a real property interest in Southland’s surface estate could
not give rise to a covenant burdening Southland’s mineral estate. As a
result, the court found no privity of estate, and that the L63 Agreement
was not a covenant running with the land.
3. Southland: Rejecting Badlands—Court Precludes Equivalent of
Priming Lien in Favor of Midstream Gatherer
Although the court in Southland ruled that the L63 Agreement
could be rejected as an executory contract, it also held in dicta that
Southland could sell its assets free and clear of the L63 Agreement even
if it was a covenant running with the land.384 In doing so, it rejected
Badlands. First, the court noted that section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code should be broadly applied.385 A covenant running with the land
does not constitute something other than an “interest” as that term is used
in section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.386 The question should not be
whether a covenant runs with the land is an “interest,” but whether there
are grounds under section 363(f)(1)–(5) of the Bankruptcy Code to sell
the asset free and clear of the covenant.387
According to Southland, Wyoming foreclosure law allowing a
senior lienholder to foreclose out a junior encumbrance, including a
covenant running with the land, satisfies section 363(f)(1) of the
Bankruptcy code. Accordingly, Southland could sell its assets free and
clear of any covenant running with the land arising from the L63
Agreement.388
Wyoming law also allows the satisfaction of a covenant running
with the land by money judgment. As the court recited, “[u]nder
Wyoming law, it is well established that both legal and equitable
remedies are available in covenant enforcement actions. Valid
382 .See id.
383. Id. at 86–87.
384. Id. at 96–97.
385. Id. at 97 (citing In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003)).
386. See id.
387. Id. (citing In re Energytec, 739 F.3d 215, 225-26 (5th Cir. 2013)).
388. Id. at 97–98.
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covenants, like other contracts and property interests, can be enforced and
protected by both legal and equitable remedies as appropriate . . . .”389 As
a result, Southland could also sell its assets “free and clear” under section
363(f)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.390
VI. THE SOUTHLAND CONUNDRUM: BIG PICTURE APPLICATION OF
RECENT RULINGS AND REMAINING UNCERTAINTY
A.

Rejecting Gathering Agreements: Far from a Panacea

On December 5, 2019, Wamsutter's Chief Executive Officer,
Alan Armstrong, summarily dismissed questions raised at an investor
conference about the potential rejection of Wamsutter's gathering
agreements in bankruptcy.391 Armstrong noted his frustration with the
question, pointed out that none of Wamsutter's gathering agreements with
other producers had ever been rejected, and stated that rejection made no
sense because “there is no other feasible way to move the commodity to
the market and get paid than to own the gathering system, and so if you
think about the opportunity to reject a contract you would have to believe
the avoided cost of building a system . . . is better than current pricing.”392
Armstrong's analysis reflects a harsh reality. Even if an upstream
debtor can reject its gathering agreement, is there any economically
feasible alternative that will enable the upstream debtor to get its
produced minerals to market? That is a very real and very difficult
question for some bankrupt upstream debtors whose leases are located in
isolated areas, areas with minimal pipeline development, or in areas in
which one midstream gatherer provides substantially all gathering
services to upstream producers.
Southland presents a prime example of this. While Southland
successfully rejected the L63 Agreement, the question quickly became
“what next?” If Southland will not use Wamsutter, but Wamsutter is the

389. Id. at 98 (citing Essex Holding, LLC v. Basic Props., Inc., 427 P.3d 708, 724 (Wyo.

2018)).
390. Id. at 98–99.
391. Allison Good, Gas Gathering Contracts Safe from Customer Credit Woes, Williams
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only gathering system around, Southland will have to develop its own
pipeline at great cost. As noted above, Wamsutter invested hundreds of
millions of dollars developing pipeline based on Southland’s bullish
expectations. Southland lacks capital to develop its own pipeline, and its
reserves are already fully encumbered. Southland must, therefore,
consider alternatives. Can Southland incentivize a Wamsutter competitor
to develop new gathering systems to service its wells? Unfortunately, the
answer is “not likely.” Further, the cost of development may exceed the
value of Southland's reserves, sounding a death knell to Southland’s
continuing operations.
The Southland conundrum does not end there. If Southland
cannot negotiate any economically favorable gathering agreement, it may
have no real chance of selling its assets for value. Imagine the following
hypothetical:
Southland possesses mineral reserves valued at
$500,000,000 and successfully rejected Wamsutter’s Gas Gathering
Agreements in bankruptcy.393 Due to liquidity issues, Southland cannot
afford a new gathering and processing system and has no alternative
midstream counterparty with which to enter into a new gathering
agreement. Due to depressed mineral prices, Southland’s lenders are
under-secured and cannot loan Southland more money to develop a
gathering system.394 As a result, Southland cannot produce and sell its
minerals. It has no means of monetizing its reserves.
Faced with such a bad situation, Southland may seek to liquidate
its assets, but who would buy Southland’s assets? A buyer would have
to negotiate a new gathering agreement with Wamsutter or spend a huge
sum of money developing its own gathering and processing system,
which is implausible.395 Wamsutter may refuse negotiations because of
its own interest in acquiring Southland’s assets. Moreover, without a
gathering agreement, there is simply too much risk for any potential
purchaser to buy Southland’s assets. Accordingly, Southland can neither
monetize its reserves through operations nor monetize its assets through
a sale to a third-party purchaser. Southland’s senior reserve-based lender
may therefore decline to foreclose on its collateral for substantially the

393. See In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 623 B.R. at 96–97.
394. See supra Part I (describing the collapse in energy prices during 2020).
395. See supra Section II.A.1. (describing the importance of gathering agreements to oil

and gas production).
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same reasons. Southland’s lender would simply step into Southland’s
shoes with no means of disposing of its collateral in a lucrative manner.
That leaves Wamsutter as the only remaining party that may have
an interest in Southland’s assets. Wamsutter already owns a gathering
and processing system capable of servicing Southland’s wells and is
familiar with the assets.396 Regardless, Wamsutter has no real
competition to purchase Southland’s assets, and so Southland’s
bargaining power in sale negotiations is limited. Specifically, Wamsutter
and Southland know, in this hypothetical, that Southland’s assets will
enable Wamsutter to mitigate its losses and possibly even make a profit,
but Wamsutter has no remaining competitors. As a result, Wamsutter
will likely offer, and Southland will likely accept, a heavily discounted
purchase price. Wamsutter becomes the only winner in Southland’s
bankruptcy case in this hypothetical: Wamsutter purchases Southland’s
assets for a pittance, and then extracts, gathers, and processes the minerals
at great profit.
In the Southland bankruptcy case, Wamsutter quickly realized the
power of its position, regardless of whether its Gas Gathering
Agreements were rejected. Months into the bankruptcy case, Wamsutter
filed a Motion for Adequate Protection, or Alternatively, for Relief from
the Automatic Stay.397 In that motion, Wamsutter pointed out that it was
the sole means of monetizing Southland’s assets, that Southland had no
other means of getting its product to market, and that constructing an
alternative system would be complex and could not be completed on any
expedited timetable.398 Wamsutter argued that because it was not getting
paid what it was owed by Southland, but was still processing Southland’s
minerals, it should be able to simply take Southland’s gas and process
and sell it for Wamsutter’s own benefit.399 After its Gas Gathering
Agreements were rejected, Wamsutter only slightly shifted its position
and engaged in negotiations to acquire all of Southland’s assets at a
tremendous discount.

396. See supra Section V.C.
397. Wamsutter LLC’s Motion for Adequate Protection, or Alternatively, for Relief from

the Automatic Stay, In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, No. 20-10158, (2020) (D.I. 843).
398. Id. at ¶ 8.
399. Id. at ¶ 14.
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The Southland Conundrum: Underwriting Considerations

From an underwriting perspective, banking clients with whom the
authors have spoken pointedly raise similar concerns. Is a successful
rejection of a gathering agreement really a success? Is rejection the
backstop that lenders should rely on to ensure they retain a first-priority
lien on their collateral? Are there alternative means for midstream
gatherers to finance the construction of gathering systems to eliminate or
at least mitigate confusion and risk? If a lender's reserve-based loan is
secured by reserves that cannot be brought to market, what is the real
value of its collateral? Does it have any value to any party other than the
midstream entity that already has a developed pipeline? All are difficult
questions, and the Southland case evidences just how troubling these
issues can be.
Southland’s conundrum should not be understated. Regardless of
reserve reports or other reserve valuations, the minerals securing
Southland’s lenders’ debts are essentially worth what Wamsutter is
willing to pay for them. Accordingly, while Extraction and Southland
appear to be favorable cases to lenders to upstream debtors, they may
provide only cold comfort. There is little practical difference between
the outcomes in Southland and in Alta Mesa and Badlands. In each case
the midstream gatherer’s interests dominated the debtor’s effort to
reorganize and deprived the debtor’s lender of value.
One potential solution addresses the nature and construction of
gathering agreements. As illustrated above, midstream gatherers often
rely on dedications and specific language in gathering agreements to
establish a covenant running with the land that encumbers the upstream
counterparty’s mineral interests.400 In doing so, the gatherer seeks to
ensure that it recoups its costs of construction and perhaps makes a profit.
The creation of a later-in-time real property encumbrance is, however,
detrimental to the upstream counterparty’s lender and may cause an
immediate breach of the upstream borrower’s credit agreement. 401 Given
the conflicts between the parties’ interests, one must question whether
there is a better way. Based on the authors’ experiences in other

400. See supra Section II.A.2.
401. See, e.g., In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 550 B.R. 59, 67–68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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industries,402 we offer that midstream gatherers could accomplish their
goals through debt financing and inter-creditor agreements with their
upstream counterparty’s lender.
First, doing so would promote transparency. Earlier-in-time
lenders would not be surprised by later-in-time encumbrances associated
with the development of gathering systems that benefitted their
borrower’s operations. That transparency would help prevent surprise
credit agreement defaults like that referenced in Sabine.403 Moreover,
recording and providing notice of a gatherer’s lien, along with an
intercreditor and subordination agreement, would provide certainty to all
parties about who has what rights in the borrower’s collateral.
Second, a debt instrument with a recorded lien on the upstream
borrower’s minerals would achieve the gatherer’s goal of recouping the
costs incurred constructing the gathering system.
Through an
intercreditor and subordination agreement, the borrower, lender, and
gatherer could come to terms on the cost and scope of the development
project and agree which party—the lender or the gatherer—should have
priority of payments from extracted minerals. The lender and gatherer
could even negotiate how proceeds of the sale of the borrower’s assets
would be remitted to each party in the event of a sale, providing certainty
should the borrower later file for bankruptcy and sell its assets under
section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. That certainty of some recovery
from the proceeds of a sale should be superior to the chance of possessing
nothing but a general unsecured claim if, in the alternative, the gatherer’s
agreement was rejected. Moreover, possessing a valid secured claim may
entitle a gatherer to credit bid its debt under section 363(k) of the
Bankruptcy Code should it wish to acquire the upstream borrower’s
assets in a bankruptcy sale.404
Finally, structuring the borrower’s repayment obligations as a
secured debt instrument eliminates the need for speculative volume-

402. The authors have witnessed the successful use of junior debt financing and
intercreditor and subordination agreements to allow borrowers’ to successfully expand
operations in various industries, including heavy machinery manufacturing, horticulture,
automotive services, real estate development, marketing and advertising, science and
technology, oilfield services, shipping and trucking, meat packing, ranching, retail, and many
more.
403. See, e.g., Sabine, 550 B.R. at 67–68.
404. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2018) (allowing a secured creditor to credit big value of its
interest in debtor’s collateral in section 363 sale).
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based repayment obligations like those found in Southland, which gave
rise to damages claims by Wamsutter greatly exceeding any amount spent
to develop the gathering system. As shown above, the Wamsutter Gas
Gathering Agreements had approximately thirty-year terms. The authors
are unaware of any reason why Wamsutter could not have obtained a
secured promissory note from Southland with a similar term and fixed or
even floating repayment schedule. With such a note in place, a gatherer
could simply agree to gather and process the borrower’s extracted
minerals for a market fee which, when paid in conjunction with debt
service payments, would ensure that the gatherer is repaid and earns a
healthy profit. That could potentially reduce volatility for the benefit of
all parties involved.
VII. CONCLUSION
An upstream debtor’s ability to reject a gathering agreement in
bankruptcy is, at times, critical to its efforts to reorganize. If a debtor
proves that its gathering agreement is an executory contract and rejects it
under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is absolved of any
future obligations under the agreement. Moreover, the midstream
counterparty to the agreement will receive only a general unsecured claim
in the debtor’s bankruptcy case, which is likely to receive only partial
payment.405 After rejecting the agreement, the debtor can renegotiate a
new agreement, contract with a different midstream company, or develop
its own gathering system as part of its restructuring. A debtor’s ability to
reject a gathering agreement can therefore provide great flexibility in a
bankruptcy restructuring.406
However, a debtor may not be able to reject a gathering
agreement if it is deemed a covenant running with the land.407 A covenant
running with the land is a real property interest and, in most courts, not
subject to rejection under the Bankruptcy Code. 408 To qualify as a
covenant running with the land, the gathering agreement in question must
typically satisfy at least three elements under most states’ laws: (1) the
405. See id. §§ 506–507 (referred to as “general” unsecured claims to differentiate them
from “priority” unsecured claims because they receive no special treatment under the
Bankruptcy Code.)
406. See supra Section II.B.2.
407. See supra Section II.B.2.
408. See supra Section III.B.
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parties must intend to create a covenant running with the land; (2) the
covenant must touch and concern the land it seeks to encumber; and (3)
there must be privity between the contracting parties.409 Specifically, the
intent is typically determined by the terms of the agreement and behavior
of the parties; and a covenant may touch and concern the land where it
affects the legal rights of the interest owner, or directly affects the value
or use of the interest the parties seek to encumber. Finally, there may be
privity when the owner of the asset the parties seek to encumber actually
conveys some right, title, or interest in that asset contemporaneously with
the covenant.
The issue of whether gathering agreements are executory
contracts subject to rejection or covenants running with the land is an
important issue in oil and gas reorganizations and has been litigated to
judgment no less than five times in as many years. The earliest case
addressing the issue, Sabine, applied a narrow test under Texas law and
ruled that a gathering agreement that dedicates only produced minerals
does not create a covenant running with the land because, under Texas
law, produced minerals are personal property.410 Two cases that
followed, Alta Mesa and Badlands, rejected Sabine and ruled that
gathering agreements created covenants running with the land where the
gathering agreements dedicated real property interests related to the
debtor’s mineral estate, even if not the mineral estate itself. Moreover,
the court’s ruling in Badlands indicated that covenants running with the
land cannot be removed by a bankruptcy sale under section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Badlands decisions is particularly concerning for
reserve-based lenders because it enables a later-in-time encumbrance to
survive the foreclosure of an earlier-in-time lien. The continuing laterin-time encumbrance may preclude the foreclosing lender from
recovering any value from its encumbered collateral.
Recently, at least two courts have ruled against Alta Mesa and
Badlands by holding that gathering agreements do not create covenants
running with the land unless they materially affect the owner’s rights in
its minerals. In so ruling, the courts in Extraction and Southland both
recognized that regardless of the language of dedications in gathering
agreements, the agreements are fundamentally service agreements related
to the gathering and processing of produced gas, which is personal
409. See supra Section III.B.
410. See supra Section III.B.
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property, and a covenant running with the land cannot apply to personal
property interests.
While Extraction and Southland both follow Sabine, the court in
Chesapeake affirmed, in dicta, the court’s ruling in Alta Mesa. As a
result, at least one court recognizes Alta Mesa as good law. Even so, the
court in Chesapeake recognized that covenants running with the land are
generally disfavored under Texas law, which supports a more
conservative application of the covenant test than that found in Alta Mesa.
Regardless, the successful rejection of an upstream debtor’s
gathering agreement may not ensure the debtor’s ability to reorganize.
As illustrated in Southland, the rejection of a gathering agreement may
create additional problems and preclude a market sale of the debtor’s
assets. Accordingly, debtors should analyze whether rejection is
necessary and how it may affect their cases before proceeding. Similarly,
lenders should proactively investigate and work to address risks to their
collateral associated with gathering agreements both in initial
underwriting, documentation, and during the life of their loan.

